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Abstract
We introduce a new class of bankruptcy problems in which the value of the
estate is endogenous and depends on agentsinvestment decisions. There are two
investment alternatives: investing in a company and becoming a shareholder
(risky asset) and depositing money into a bank (risk-free asset). Bankruptcy
is a possible event only for the risky asset. We dene a game between agents
each of which aims to maximize his expected payo¤ by choosing an investment
alternative and a company management which aims to maximize the investment
in the company by choosing a bankruptcy rule. There are two types of agents in
our model, who are di¤erentiated by their incomes. We, rst, consider three well-
known bankruptcy rules: the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule
and the constrained equal losses rule. We show that there always exists a pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which involves the proportional rule.
This result is independent of the income distribution in the economy and holds
even under one-sided uncertainty on the income distribution. We also show that
our results can be extended to a larger set of rules containing the Talmud rule
along with other rules that belong to the TAL-family. Our results provide, at
least, a partial explanation from a strategic point of view for the popular use of
the proportional rule in allocating bankrupt companiesassets to shareholders.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As early as 1985, Young argues that the incentives of agents should be incorporated
into cost-sharing models.1 He summarizes the motivation of the paper in the following
passage:
"The problem with these approaches (ad-hoc cost sharing mechanisms) is that
they ignore the problem of motivation: why should a customer pay his allocated cost
if it exceeds the benets or the alternative cost of obtaining the service by some other
means? This incentive argument is especially critical in the case of voluntary associ-
ation such as a club, a public consortium, or a cartel, where the partners must rst
agree in the manner of splitting the costs and benets before they can proceed with
the enterprise."
Thomson (2003) also addresses the need to combine noncooperative and market-
based approaches in the following paragraph:
"An important question that we will not address is the extent to which the choice
of particular division rules a¤ects agents incentives to make commitments that one
party may in the end be unable to honor. In the context of bankruptcy, these are the
incentives to loan and to borrow. In many of the other applications, the parameters
of the problems to be solved also result from decisions that agents have made, and
whatever rule is used at the division stage will in general have had an e¤ect on these
earlier choices. In order to handle these kinds of issues, we would need to embed divi-
sion rules in a more complete model in which risk-taking, e¤ort, and other variables
chosen by agents, such as lenders, borrowers, tax payers, government agencies and
others, are explicitly described, stochastic returns to economic activities are factored
in, and so on."
In this paper, we introduce a new class of bankruptcy problems in which the
value of the estate is endogenous and depends on agentsinvestment decisions that
also determine their claims. Our theoretical framework incorporates important eco-
nomic factors such as the income distribution, stochastic returns of risky investment
projects, and return on a risk-free outside option. Our model is motivated by the fol-
lowing facts: (i) In real bankruptcy situations, agents might act strategically and in
line with their incentives, (ii) bankruptcy might occur following an investment deci-
sion with stochastic outcomes, (iii) the choice of the bankruptcy rule and investment
decisions have impacts on each other through incentives, (iv) the claims distribution
might have an impact on agents decisions if there are peer e¤ects, and (v) many
real bankruptcy situations involve payments (to shareholders, lenders, partners etc.),
which are not respected by the borrower.
In our model, there are two investment alternatives: investing in a company
and becoming shareholder (risky asset) or depositing money into a bank (risk-free
asset). Bankruptcy is a possible event only for the risky asset. We dene a game
1 I would like to thank Peyton Young for referring me to this paper.
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between agents each of which aims to maximize his expected payo¤ by choosing
an investment alternative and a company management which aims to maximize the
investment in the company by choosing a bankruptcy rule. This setup is also in line
with some recent suggestions in favor of a more liberal bankruptcy law, which would
provide a menu of rules and allows companies to choose one among them (see Hart,
2000). There are two types of agents in the model, who are di¤erentiated by their
incomes. We consider three well-known bankruptcy rules: the proportional rule, the
constrained equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. In the game,
the company chooses the bankruptcy rule and later all agents simultaneously choose
whether to invest in the risky asset (i.e., the project initiated by the company) or
the risk-free asset (savings account in a bank). Our results provide a noncooperative
support for the proportional rule.2 In particular, we show that there always exists a
pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that involves the proportional rule.
This statement is not valid for the constrained equal awards and the constrained
equal losses rules. The direct implication of this result is that the proportional rule
never leads to an investment in the company that is lower than the one under the
constrained equal awards rule or the constrained equal losses rule; and in some cases
leads to an investment in the company strictly higher than the one under two rules.
Moreover, the result supporting the proportional rule is independent of the income
distribution and holds even under one-sided uncertainty on the income distribution.
We also extend our results to include all rules in the TAL-family (Moreno-Ternero
& Villar, 2006). This extension is interesting since the TAL-family includes some
well-known rules such as the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal
losses rule and the Talmud rule. We conduct comparative static analyses on income
distribution and risk-return parameters and o¤er policy implications.
1.2 Overview of the Literature
The bankruptcy problem was rst introduced formally by ONeill (1982). It de-
scribes a situation in which there is a perfectly divisible estate to be allocated to a
nite number of agents, whose claims add up to an amount larger than the estate.3
A bankruptcy problem can be represented by a claims vector and an estate. A bank-
ruptcy rule is a function that associates a division of the estate with every bankruptcy
problem. Many real life situations such as distributing a will to inheritants, liquidat-
ing the assets of a bankrupt company, rationing, taxation, and sharing the costs of a
public facility can be described using parsimonious bankruptcy models.
Following the introduction of the bankruptcy problem, most research on bank-
ruptcy approaches the problem from a normative (axiomatic) perspective and aims to
compare di¤erent rules by their properties. As Thomson (2003) shows, this normative
2For additional support for the proportional rule, we refer the reader to Chun (1988), Bergantiños
& Sanches (2002), Chambers & Thomson (2002), Ching & Kakkar (2001), Chun & Lee (2007), De
Frutos (1999), Gächter & Riedl (2005; 2006), Hougaard & Østerdal (2005), Ju (2003), Ju, Miyagawa
& Sakai (2007), and Moreno-Ternero (2002; 2006a; 2006b).
3This corresponds to Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the US bankruptcy law.
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approach was successful in determining strong contenders, i.e., a small set of bank-
ruptcy rules with particularly desirable properties. The most prominent rules are
the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses
rule and the Talmud rule. The proportional rule allocates the estate proportionally
with respect to claims. The constrained equal awards rule allocates the estate as
equal as possible taking claims as upper bounds and similarly the constrained equal
losses rule allocates the shortage of the estate in an equal way (shares bounded below
by zero). The Talmud rule behaves like the constrained equal awards rule when the
estate is less than half of the total claims and like the constrained equal losses rule
when the estate is more than half of the total claims. These rules will also be used
in our research. For an extensive survey of the axiomatic literature, the reader is
referred to Moulin (2002), Thomson (2003) and Thomson (2006).
Some researchers (Yaari & Bar-Hillel, 1984; Moulin, 2000; and Herrero, Moreno-
Ternero & Ponti, 2006) o¤er an informal characterization of di¤erent circumstances
in which a particular bankruptcy rule is the most sensible one. Some examples are
the use of the proportional rule in income taxation and in the allocation of bankrupt
rms assets to shareholders, the constrained equal losses rule in the provision of
health services, and the constrained equal awards rule in the allocation of a bankrupt
banks assets to depositors.
Still another approach to bankruptcy problems is the game theoretical approach.
There are di¤erent strands within the game theoretical approach to bankruptcy prob-
lems. Historically, the rst one is the cooperative game theoretical approach. This
approach transforms the bankruptcy problem to a transferable utility game or a coali-
tional bargaining game and studies cooperative solution concepts such as the core,
the kernel etc. Aumann & Maschler (1985), Young (1985), Curiel, Maschler & Tijs
(1987) and Dagan & Volij (1993) are some of the papers among others, which apply
cooperative game theoretical approach to analyze bankruptcy problems.
We know that incentives and strategic behavior play a signicant role in bank-
ruptcy problems in real life. Hence, a natural and a fruitful approach to bankruptcy
problems is a noncooperative game theoretical one. The noncooperative game the-
oretical approach models the bankruptcy problem as a noncooperative game among
the claimants and studies the equilibrium of the game. This approach also provides a
noncooperative support for bankruptcy rules. There are only a handful of papers with
this approach. ONeill (1982), Chun (1989), Dagan, Serrano & Volij (1997), Moreno-
Ternero (2002), Herrero (2003), García-Jurado, González-Díaz & Villar (2006) and
Chang & Hu (2008) are the papers, which apply noncooperative game theoretical
approach to analyze bankruptcy problems. Ching & Kakkar (2001) and Araujo &
Páscoa (2002) approach the problem from a slightly di¤erent perspective by o¤ering
market based formulations. The major motivation of all these studies is that when
the authority does not have a priori preferences concerning the rule that will be im-
plemented, it might resort to implementing a noncooperative game form (a set of
rules or procedures) in which the strategic interactions of claimants determine the
rule to be used in equilibrium. Depending on the strategic game form the policymaker
implements, the resulting equilibrium rules may di¤er as the studies mentioned above
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show.
The paper most closely related to ours is Kibris & Kibris (2008). They also
analyze the investment implications of prominent bankruptcy rules. The major dif-
ferences between our models can be listed as: (i) In our model, the bankruptcy rule
decision is embedded in a sequential game, whereas in their paper they compare in-
vestment volumes under di¤erent bankruptcy rules, (ii) in our paper, agents invest
either nothing or everything in the risky asset, whereas in their paper agents solve an
optimization problem to determine this amount, (iii) in our paper there are two types
of agents (an arbitrary number of them), whereas in their paper, there are two agents,
and (iv) in our paper, agents are risk neutral and there is a risk-free outside option,
whereas in their paper, they allow for risk aversion and there is no outside option.
As a result of similarities between our models, some of our results are identical. For
instance, in both papers, the proportional rule leads to more investment than the
constrained equal awards rule. The major di¤erence between our results is that in
our paper, the proportional rule leads to more investment than the constrained equal
losses rule, whereas in their paper, this is not always valid.
1.3 Our Contribution
Contributions of our paper can be listed as: (a) endogenizing the determination of
the bankruptcy rule with a noncooperative procedure, (b) endogenizing the value
of claims and the estate, (c) incorporating the well-known bankruptcy model into a
context that involves decision-making under uncertainty and mimicks a market envi-
ronment, (d) explaining a real-life phenomenon, which is the use of the proportional
rule in allocating bankrupt companys assets to shareholders (e) providing a nonco-
operative justication for the equity theory of Selten (1978) in a relevant context
and (f) providing a noncooperative framework in which the bankruptcy rule decision
depends on both companys and agentsincentives. Firstly, endogenously determined
bankruptcy rule, claims and estate are new in the literature. In most of the papers
on bankruptcy, the analysis is based on exogenously xed bankruptcy rule, claims
and the estate. In real life, obviously agentsdecisions and hence the value of claims
and the estate depend on the bankruptcy rule and the bankruptcy rule choice de-
pends in turn on agents actions. Thus, the bankruptcy rule, claims and estate are
all endogenously determined. Secondly, many real life instances that involve a bank-
ruptcy problem also involve an investment decision under uncertainty. In our paper,
we model the whole investment process at an earlier stage, i.e. before bankruptcy is
realized.4 With this approach, we also incorporate factors that play important roles
in real-life bankruptcy problems such as stochastic returns, risk, attitudes towards
risk and income distribution into the bankruptcy problem. Our model gives, at least,
a partial explanation for the popular use of the proportional rule in the liquidation
process of a bankrupt company and also its use in each priority class in sequential
priority rules employed by some bankruptcy laws such as the US bankruptcy law
4 In fact, in our model, bankruptcy might not occur. It is the possibility of bankruptcy on which
companys and agentsdecisions are based.
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(see Chapter 11). In a slightly di¤erent literature, the equity theory of Selten (1978)
emphasizes the relative value of inputs and outputs. Since changes in the value of the
estate does not a¤ect this value, the equity theory predicts the use of the proportional
solution in our context. Hence, our paper provides a noncooperative justication for
the equity theory in the bankruptcy context. Finally, in all bankruptcy papers with
noncooperative approaches, the strategic interaction takes place among claimants,
whereas the bankruptcy rule decision is inuenced by both lendersand borrowers
interests in our paper. It is determined as a result of a sequential game played among
the lender and borrowers. Hence, our paper is the rst one that involves both lenders
(potential claimants) and a borrower.
1.4 Road Map
The organization of the paper is as follows: We rst introduce the standard bank-
ruptcy problem and the bankruptcy rules that we employ in this paper and provide
some preparatory results in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce the strategic model
of bankruptcy under uncertainty and the bankruptcy problem with an endogenous
estate. In Section 4 and its subsections, we analyze the equilibria of the bankruptcy
game introduced in Section 3 and present some extensions. Section 5 contains com-
parative static analyses on risk-return and income distribution parameters. In Sec-
tion 6, we discuss our assumptions, results, and future research on the topic. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 Bankruptcy Problems and Rules
Bankruptcy is typically dened as a situation in which the total claims of claimants
exceed the size of the available estate. It is sometimes also referred to as the conicting
claims problem. Formally, a bankruptcy problem is represented by a set of claimants
N = f1; 2; :::; ng, a claims vector C = (c1; c2; :::; cn) and ci 2 R++, an estate E 2 R+
to be divided among the claimants and the inequality
X
i2N ci > E. We denote the
set of all such bankruptcy problems (C;E) by B.
A bankruptcy rule is a mechanism that allocates the estate to claimants given
any bankruptcy problem. Formally, a bankruptcy rule F is a function mapping each
bankruptcy problem (C;E) 2 B into Rn+ such that for all i 2 N , Fi(C;E) 2 [0; ci] andX
i2N Fi(C;E) = E. Below, we dene the bankruptcy rules we use in our analysis.
The proportional rule allocates the estate proportionally with respect to claims.
Denition 1 (Proportional Rule) For all (C;E) 2 B, we have P (C;E)  pC,
where p is given by p = (E=
P
i2N ci).
The constrained equal awards rule allocates the estate as equal as possible taking
claims as upper bounds.
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Denition 2 (Constrained Equal Awards Rule) For all (C;E) 2 B, and all
j 2 N , we have CEAj(C;E)  minfcj ; ceag, where cea solves
P
i2N minfci; ceag =
E.
The constrained equal losses rule allocates the shortage of the estate (i.e., the
total loss due to bankruptcy) in an equal way (shares bounded below by zero).
Denition 3 (Constrained Equal Losses Rule) For all (C;E) 2 B, and all j 2
N , we have CELj(C;E)  maxf0; cj   celg, where cel solves
P
i2N maxf0; ci  
celg = E.
Example 1 N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, C = (10; 30; 40; 70; 100) and E = 180.
agent 1 2 3 4 5
claim 10 30 40 70 100
P 7:2 21:6 28:8 50:4 72
CEA 10 30 40 50 50
CEL 0 15 25 55 85
Note that under the constrained equal awards rule, claimants 1,2, and 3 receive
strictly more than what they would receive under the proportional rule, whereas
claimants 4 and 5 receive strictly less than what they would receive under the pro-
portional rule. Loosely speaking, the constrained equal awards rule favors small
claimants (i.e., it makes transfers from bigger claimants to smaller claimants). Also
note that under the constrained equal losses rule, claimants 4 and 5 receive strictly
more than what they would receive under the proportional rule whereas claimants
1,2, and 3 receive strictly less than what they would receive under the proportional
rule. Loosely speaking, the constrained equal losses rule favors big claimants (i.e., it
makes transfers from small claimants to big claimants). Later, we will make use of
these facts in our analysis.
Below we prove a lemma that formalizes the idea of inter-claimant transfers un-
der the constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses rules taking the
proportional rule payo¤s as a basis.
Lemma 1 Let (C;E) 2 B. Assume without loss of generality that c1  c2  :::  cn.
Then,
(i) there exists a critical level of claims, c such that for all i 2 N with ci < c,
CEAi(C;E) > Pi(C;E) and for all i 2 N with ci  c, CEAi(C;E)  Pi(C;E) and,
(ii) there exists a critical level of claims, ec such that for all i 2 N with ci < ec,
CELi(C;E) < Pi(C;E) and for all i 2 N with ci  ec, CELi(C;E)  Pi(C;E).
Proof. See Appendix B.
In Lemma 1, for a bankruptcy rule F 2 fCEA;CELg and an agent i 2 N; we pro-
vided some results on Fi(C;E) Pi(C;E). From now on, for all F 2 fP;CEA;CELg,
7
we will denote the transfer from agent i to other agents (taking the proportional pay-
o¤ vector as the reference point) under rule F in the bankruptcy problem (C;E) by
Si(C;E; F ). Hence, Si(C;E; F ) = Fi(C;E) Pi(C;E): The following lemma provides
closed form expressions for transfers under CEA and CEL in the model with two
types of agents (see Section 3), where agentstypes refer to their claims. In the model,
we denote the transfer of agent i of type t by St(C;E; F ) since, by the denitions of
all bankruptcy rules F 2 fP;CEA;CELg, transfers will be equal to St(C;E; F ), for
all agents i of type t.
Lemma 2 Let (C;E) 2 B and let Nh (Nl) denote the non-empty set of claimants
each with a claim ch (cl), with cardinality nh (nl). Assume that 0 < cl < ch. Denote
the set of all claimants by N with cardinality n = nh + nl. Then the following
statements are valid.
(a-1) If ch > cl > cea, then
(a-1-1) Sl(E;C;CEA) =
nhE[ch cl]
[nh+nl][nhch+nlcl]
> 0 and
(a-1-2) Sh(E;C;CEA) =
nlE[cl ch]
[nh+nl][nhch+nlcl]
< 0.
(a-2) If ch > cea  cl, then
(a-2-1) Sl(E;C;CEA) =
cl[nhch+nlcl E]
[nhch+nlcl]
> 0 and
(a-2-2) Sh(E;C;CEA) =
nlcl[E nhch nlcl]
nh[nhch+nlcl]
< 0.
(b-1) If ch > cl > cel, then
(b-1-1) Sl(E;C;CEL) =
nh[cl ch][nhch+nlcl E]
[nh+nl][nhch+nlcl]
< 0 and
(b-1-2) Sh(E;C;CEA) =
nl[ch cl][nhch+nlcl E]
[nh+nl][nhch+nlcl]
> 0.
(b-2) If ch > cel  cl, then
(b-2-1) Sl(E;C;CEL) =   Enhch+nlcl cl < 0 and
(b-2-2) Sh(E;C;CEL) = nlnh
Ecl
[nhch+nlcl]
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that for all F 2 fP;CEA;CELg, nhSh(C;E; F )+nlSl(C;E; F ) = 0. Hence,
the transfers are balanced. This is implied by the e¢ ciency property embedded in
the denition of a bankruptcy rule.
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3 A Strategic Model of Bankruptcy with an Endogenous
Estate
There are nh agents each with income wh and nl agents each with income wl, such
that 0 < wl < wh.5 Accordingly, Nh is the set of type h agents with jNhj = nh and
Nl is the set of type l agents with jNlj = nl. We use t to refer to a generic type i.e.,
t 2 fl; hg. Therefore, for all agents i 2 Nl[Nh, individual income wi 2 fwl; whg. Both
types of agents are risk-neutral. Hence, each agent wants to choose the investment
alternative that brings the maximum expected return. There are two investment
alternatives: agents either invest in a company and become shareholders or deposit
their money into a bank. The company has a risky investment project and depositing
money into a bank brings a risk-free return. The state space for the outcome of the
risky investment project is 
 = fs; fg where s represents success and f represents
failure. Hence, the outcome of the project is a random variable !. With probability
Pr(! = s) = s < 1, the investment project is successful and brings a payo¤ of
0 < rs  1 to the company; with probability Pr(! = f) = 1   s, the investment
project fails and brings a payo¤ of rf < rs  1 to the company. The company
promises to pay r to the depositors, which satises 0  rf < r  rs  1.6 However,
if the project fails it cannot honor all claims since rf < r. On the other hand, the
savings account at the bank pays a constant return r. We eliminate two cases that
would lead to trivial results: rf > r and r > r. If rf > r was the case, then no agent
would prefer to deposit their money to the bank and if r > r was the case, then no
agent would prefer to invest in the company. Hence, to make the problem interesting,
we assume that rf < r < r. Thus, the risky asset o¤ers a higher return in case of
success, but a lower return in case of failure (bankruptcy).7 Having introduced the
necessary parameters, now we dene the particular class of bankruptcy problems we
analyze.
Denition 4 A bankruptcy problem with an endogenous estate is a pair (C;E),
where C is a claims vector with entries ci = (1 + r)wi for all i 2 N and E =
(1+ rf )
P
i2N wi is the estate. The class of bankruptcy problems with an endogenous
estate is denoted by eB.
Our analysis will focus on the class of bankruptcy problems with an endoge-
nous estate, unless otherwise stated. All parameters mentioned above are common
knowledge. Obviously, bankruptcy is a possible event only for the rst investment
alternative.
5 In fact, what we mean by wt is the part of the income that is reserved for investment by a type
t agent.
6r is not determined as a result of an optimization problem. However, accepting r as given is
a frequently made assumption in the decisionmaking under uncertainty and the corporate nance
literature. Hence, we take r as given.
7We will use investing in the risky asset versus investing in the company interchangeably; and
investing in the risk-free asset versus depositing money into the bank interchangeably.
9
The management of the company, m, is an important player8. It chooses a bank-
ruptcy rule F , which will be implemented in case of bankruptcy. The managements
objective is to maximize the investment in the company. Note that, given r, rs, rf ,
r and s, maximizing the investment volume is identical to maximizing the prot.
The bankruptcy rule chosen a¤ects agentsinvestment decisions since it a¤ects their
return in case of bankruptcy. Hence, the company takes into account the possible
actions of agents while choosing the bankruptcy rule. As mentioned before, we use
the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, and the constrained equal
losses rule as benchmarks. Accordingly, the companys strategy space is denoted by
 m = fP;CEA;CELg. The companys decision is observed by all agents. Hence,
each decision of the company starts a proper subgame to be played by agents. We
denote these three subgames by  P ,  CEA, and  CEL.
S
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S
S
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S
S










 P  CEA  CEL
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Graph 1: Game Tree
Knowing which bankruptcy rule F is chosen by m, in the subgame  F , all agents
i 2 Nl [ Nh choose whether to invest their money in the risky asset (i.e., playing
in) or to invest in the risk-free, outside asset (i.e., playing out). This decision is
made by all agents simultaneously. For all i 2 Nl [Nh, we denote agent is actions
by ai 2 fin; outg and the actions taken by agent i under rule F 2 fP;CEA;CELg
as ai;F . We describe what each agent i would do in each subgame  F by agent is
strategy, which is denoted by si 2  i. Agent is strategy space,  i, can be written as
 i = f(ai;P ; ai;CEA; ai;CEL) j F 2 fP;CEA;CELg and ai;F 2 fin; outgg. (1)
The companys payo¤function is linear and we denote it as Vm(F ) =
P
t2fl;hg nt;inwt,
where nt;in stands for the number of type t agents who play in in the subgame  F .
Therefore, we can write the companys objective to maximize the investment as
8From now on, m denotes the company.
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max
F2fP;CEA;CELg
Vm(F ). (2)
Note that once r and rf are xed, the estate E and the claims vector C are both
determined by agentsactions. Since agent is payo¤ under bankruptcy is determined
by F , nh;in and nl;in, when writing agentspayo¤s under bankruptcy, we employ the
notation, Vi;in(F; nh;in; nl;in). Similarly, agent is transfer under rule F can be written
as Si(F; nh;in; nl;in).
Now, given agent is action in  F , the payo¤ of agent i 2 Nl [Nh can be written
as
Vi(F; ai;F ) =
8<:
Vi;out = (1 + r)wi, if ai;F = out
V ei;in(F; nh;in; nl;in) = s(1 + r)wi + (1  s)[Vi;in(P; nh;in; nl;in)
+Si(F; nh;in; nl;in)], if ai;F = in
(3)
where the superscript e refers to the expected value.9 Notice that the rst part of
V ei;in(F; nh;in; nl;in) is agent is payo¤ in case of successful completion of the project
and the second part is his payo¤ in case of bankruptcy. Also note that for the
proportional rule, Si(P; nh;in; nl;in) = 0.
The following lemma enables us to simplify the notation Vj;in(P; nh;in; nl;in), since
it shows that the payo¤ each agent receive under P is independent from other agents
types, actions etc. Consequently, we can write the payo¤ of agent j under the pro-
portional rule as Pj .
Lemma 3 Assume that for all j 2 Nl[Nh, the claims structure is cj = (1+r)wj and
the estate is E = (1 + rf )
P
i2Nl[Nh wi. Then Vj;in(P; nh;in; nl;in)  Pj = (1 + rf )wj.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The result above is valid for any nite number of types. By Lemma 3, if agent
i is of type t, then Vi;in(P; nh;in; nl;in) = (1 + rf )wt. We rewrite agent is expected
payo¤ under P as
P ei = s(1 + r)wi + (1  s)Pi. (4)
Using the expected payo¤ under the proportional rule, we can rewrite agent is ex-
pected payo¤ under CEA as
V ei;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = s(1 + r)wi + (1  s)[Pi + Si(CEA; nh;in; nl;in)]
= P ei + (1  s)Si(CEA; nh;in; nl;in), (5)
where P ei stands for the expected payo¤ that agent i would get under the proportional
rule and Si is the transfer that agent i makes under CEA. Similarly, under CEL,
the expected payo¤ of agent i can be rewritten as
9As one can see in (3), in dening agentspayo¤s from playing in in case of bankruptcy, we use
the proportional rule payo¤ as a benchmark.
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V ei;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) = s(1 + r)wi + (1  s)[Pi + Si(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)]
= P ei + (1  s)Si(CEL; nh;in; nl;in), (6)
where Si is the transfer that agent i makes under CEL.
Table 1 below, together with the sequence of actions described before and summa-
rized in Graph 1 dene the sequential game   with three proper subgames  P ; CEA,
and  CEL:
Players fmg [Nl [Nh
Strategies  m 
Y
i2Nl[Nh
 i
Payo¤s (Vm(F ); (Vi;si(F; s i)), i 2 Nl [Nh
Table 1: Sequential Game  
where s i denotes all agentsstrategies except agent i. We look for pure strat-
egy equilibria of this game. Since we want to capture sequential rationality, the
equilibrium concept that we employ is that of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
4 Analysis of Equilibrium Decisions
Now, we analyze the equilibria of the game dened above. We start the analysis
in a backward induction fashion with the subgames  F 2 f P ; CEA; CELg played
among all agents i 2 Nl [ Nh. Therefore, in the following, when we use the term
"equilibrium", it refers to the agentsequilibrium actions in the corresponding sub-
game. After analyzing agentsbehavior in each subgame, we analyze the companys
action in equilibrium. This is followed by the description of all equilibria of the game
along with the resulting investment in the company.
Before the analysis of agentsinvestment decisions in equilibrium, we prove some
preparatory lemmas and corollaries. The following corollary provides values of c andec in the class of bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates. Since the following
result provides closed form expressions for c and ec in this class, it is a corollary
of Lemma 1. Recall that for all i 2 N , wi 2 fwl; whg, where 0 < wl < wh and
jN j = n = nh + nl.
Corollary 1 Let (C;E) 2 eB. Then,
(i) c = nh;innin nl;in (1 + r)wh  
nl;in
nin nl;in
(1+r)(r rf )
(1+rf )
wl and
(ii) ec = nh;innin nl;in (1 + r)wh   nl;innin nl;in (1+r)(1+rf )(r rf ) wl.
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Proof. Recall formulas (12) and (13) from Lemma 1. If we plug into (12) and (13)
(1 + rf )(nh;inwh + nl;inwl) for E,
(1 + r)wi for ci, and
(1 + r)(nh;inwh + nl;inwl) for
P
i2N ci,
then we obtain the equations in (i) and (ii).
The following corollary of Lemma 2 derives closed form functions of transfers
under CEA and CEL.
Corollary 2 Let (C;E) 2 eB.
(a-1) If ch > cl > cea, then
(a-1-1) Sl(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) =
nh;in
nh;in+nl;in
[(1 + rf )(wh   wl)]  0 and
(a-1-2) Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in+nl;in
[(1 + rf )(wl   wh)]  0.
(a-2) If ch > cea  cl, then
(a-2-1) Sl(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = (r   rf )wl > 0 and
(a-2-2) Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in
(rf   r)wl  0.
(b-1) If ch > cl > cel, then
(b-1-1) Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =
nh;in
nh;in+nl;in
[(r   rf )(wl   wh)]  0 and
(b-1-2) Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in+nl;in
[(r   rf )(wh   wl)]  0.
(b-2) If ch > cel  cl, then
(b-2-1) Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =  (1 + rf )wl < 0 and
(b-2-2) Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in
(1 + rf )wl  0.
Proof. Recall the formulas we derived in Lemma 2. If we plug into those formulas
for all t 2 fl; hg,
(1 + r)wt for ct,
nt;in for nt, and
(1 + rf )[nl;inwl + nh;inwh] for E,
then we obtain the result.
The following lemma shows that c and ec are always between cl and ch.
Lemma 4 Let (C;E) 2 eB. Assume that nh;in > 0 and nl;in > 0. Then, for all nh;in
and nl;in, (i) cl  c  ch and (ii) cl  ec  ch.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Since if one type is making transfers the other type should be receiving transfers
in the case with two types, the result mentioned in Lemma 4 is intuitive. This result
is required for the comparative static analyses we conduct in the following lemma.
It ensures that when the number of type t 2 fl; hg agents changes, the identity of
the type making transfers and the identity of the type receiving transfers stays the
same.
Lemma 5 Let (C;E) 2 eB. Then,
(i) an increase in nl;in weakly decreases Sl(CEA; nh;in; nl;in),
(ii) an increase in nl;in strictly increases Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in),
(iii) an increase in nh;in weakly increases Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in),
(iv) an increase in nh;in strictly decreases Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in),
(v) an increase in nh;in weakly increases Sl(CEA; nh;in; nl;in),
(vi) an increase in nh;in strictly decreases Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in),
(vii) an increase in nl;in weakly decreases Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in), and
(viii) an increase in nl;in strictly increases Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The comparative statics stated in Lemma 5 have simple intuitions. In a nutshell,
they show the changes in per-capita transfer with respect to changes in the number
of type h and type l agents. We see that if the number of agents of types who are
making transfers increases, per-capita transfers they make decrease and per-capita
transfers other types receive increase. On the other hand, if the number of types who
are receiving transfers increases, per-capita transfers they receive decrease and per-
capita transfers other types make increase. The following lemma states that under
P , a type l agent prefers to play in if and only if a type h agent prefers to play in.
Lemma 6 Given a bankruptcy problem (C;E) 2 eB, Ph  Vh if and only if Pl  Vl.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Tie-Breaking Assumption Every agent plays in when he is indi¤erent between
in and out.
This tie-breaking assumption is employed in the rest of the paper. The following
lemma states that each agents decision in equilibrium is determined by his type only.
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Lemma 7 (Symmetry) If agents i and j are of the same type t 2 fl; hg, their
strategies are the same in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 7 has three important implications. First of all, it shows that if there
exists an equilibrium it will be symmetric, i.e., same types play the same strategy
in equilibrium. The tie-breaking assumption is important for the validity of Lemma
7. If agents of the same type play strategies that are di¤erent from each other when
these agents are indi¤erent, our statement is not valid anymore. However, breaking
the ties in favor of playing in is not crucial for the proofs. Assuming that every agent
plays out when he is indi¤erent would work equally well.
Second, this symmetry result enables us to employ a more compact notation for
equilibrium actions in subgames  F (in game  ): (ah;F ; al;F ) means that all type h
agents play ah;F and all type l agents play al;F in the subgame  F .
Third, this result also enables us to use a simpler notation when writing agents
expected payo¤s. Since we know that agents of the same type act identically, we can
write the expected payo¤ of a representative type t agent who plays in under rule F
as V et (F; s t) instead of writing individual expected payo¤ as V ei;in(F; nh;in; nl;in).
10
We will employ this notation in the remaining part of the model.
The following corollary relates the symmetry result to the equilibrium values of
Vm(F ). Since we show that agents of the same type have the same strategies in
equilibrium, this reduces the number of possible values of equilibrium investment.
Corollary 3 In equilibrium, Vm(F ) can take only four values: 0, nhwh, nlwl and
nhwh + nlwl.
Proof. Since there are two types of agents, by Lemma 7, there are four possible
combinations of strategy proles under the symmetry result proven above:
(i) Both types play out. Thus, Vm(F ) = 0,
(ii) Type h agents play in, type l agents play out. Thus, Vm(F ) = nhwh,
(iii) Type h agents play out, type l agents play in. Thus, Vm(F ) = nlwl,
(iv) Both types play in. Thus, Vm(F ) = nhwh + nlwl.
The following lemma shows that certain strategy proles cannot exist in any
equilibrium under CEA and CEL.
Lemma 8 The following statements about strategy proles are valid.
(i) In the subgame  CEA, the strategy prole (for all i 2 Nh,  i = in and for all
j 2 Nl,  j = out) cannot be an equilibrium,
(ii) In the subgame  CEL, the strategy prole (for all i 2 Nh,  i = out and for all
j 2 Nl,  j = in) cannot be an equilibrium.
10The equal treatment of equals property asserts that the agents with equal claims should receive
the same payo¤. This property is satised by all rules we consider here, which enables us to use this
compact notation.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
The result in this lemma has a simple intuition: if, in equilibrium, the parameter
values are such that even the type of agents who are making transfers nd playing
in optimal, the type of agents who are receiving transfers also nd it optimal to play
in.
4.1 Characterization of All Nash Equilibria in  P ;  CEA; and  CEL
In this subsection, we describe agentsinvestment behavior and characterize all Nash
equilibria in subgames  P ;  CEA; and  CEL. Recall that Lemma 7 enables us to
use type best responses instead of agent best responses. Hence, in this section, we
use type ts best response to a strategy played by the other type. Denote the best
response of type t agents to action a t played by the other type of agents in the
subgame  F by BRt(F; a t).11
Under the Proportional Rule:
In the subgame  P , the following payo¤matrix can be used to show representative
type h and type l agents expected payo¤s. The rst (second) item in each cell
represents each type h (type l) agents expected payo¤. Matrices are drawn for
representative agents of type h and type l.
h n l in out
in P eh ; P
e
l P
e
h ; Vl;out
out Vh;out; P
e
l Vh;out; Vl;out
Table 2: Payo¤ Matrix under the Proportional Rule
Recall that by Lemma 3, the expected payo¤ of each agent is independent of other
agents strategies under P . This implies that all equilibria are dominant strategy
equilibria. Also, remember that by Lemma 6, P el < Vl;out if and only if P
e
h < Vh;out.
Therefore, if P eh  Vh;out, then BRh(P; in) = BRh(P; out) = in, and similarly if
P el  Vl;out, then BRl(P; in) = BRl(P; out) = in. If P eh < Vh;out, then BRh(P; in) =
BRh(P; out) = out, and similarly if P el < Vl;out, then BRl(P; in) = BRl(P; out) =
out. Also recall that (ah;F ; al;F ) means that all type h agents play ah;F and all type l
agents play al;F in the subgame  F . We now describe agentsequilibrium strategies
in the subgame  P .
Equilibria in the subgame  P :
11Also note that each agent has one information set in each subgame and two actions. Therefore,
the terms strategy and action refer to same objects in subgames  P ,  CEA, and  CEL. Hence, we
prefer to stick to action notation instead of introducing strategy notation for subgames, although we
use the terms strategy and action interchangeably.
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Case 1 If for all t 2 fl; hg, P et < Vt;out, then the unique equilibrium strategy prole
is (ah;P ; al;P ) = (out; out).
Case 2 If for all t 2 fl; hg, P et  Vt;out, then the unique equilibrium strategy prole
is (ah;P ; al;P ) = (in; in).
Note that neither (in; out) nor (out; in) equilibria are possible. This is due to
proportionality, which implies that P eh  Vh;out if and only if P el  Vl;out.
Under the Constrained Equal Awards Rule:
In the subgame  CEA:
h n l in out
in
P eh + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in);
P el + (1  s)Sl(CEA; in)
P eh ; Vl;out
out Vh;out; P
e
l Vh;out; Vl;out
Table 3: Payo¤ Matrix under the Constrained Equal Awards Rule
By the denition of the constrained equal awards rule and Lemma 1, Sh(CEA; in) <
0 and Sl(CEA; in) > 0. If the outside asset pays more than the best possible expected
payo¤ that type l agents can get, the analysis is trivial since then type l agents would
never play in. Hence, we assume that V el (CEA; in) = P
e
l + (1   s)Sl(CEA; in) >
Vl;out. This assumption implies that BRl(P; in) = in. The relationship between P el
and Vl;out determines type l agentsbest response to type h agents playing out. If
P el  Vl, then BRl(P; out) = in; if Pl < Vl;out, then BRl(P; out) = out. On the
other hand, type hs best response against in depends on the relationship between
V eh (CEA; in) = P
e
h + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in) and Vh;out. If
V eh (CEA; in) = P
e
h + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in)  Vh;out,
then BRh(P; in) = in; if
V eh (CEA; in) = P
e
h + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in) < Vh;out,
then BRh(P; in) = out. Therefore, these inequalities characterize agentsequilibrium
strategies in the subgame  CEA.
Equilibria in the subgame  CEA:
Case 1 If for all t 2 fl; hg, P et < Vt;out, then the unique equilibrium strategy prole
is (ah;CEA; al;CEA) = (out; out).
Case 2 If for all t 2 fl; hg, P et  Vt;out and V eh (CEA; in) = P eh+(1 s)Sh(CEA; in) <
Vh;out, then the unique equilibrium strategy prole is (ah;CEA; al;CEA) = (out; in).
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Case 3 If for all t 2 fl; hg, P et  Vt;out and V eh (CEA; in) = P eh+(1 s)Sh(CEA; in) 
Vh;out, then the unique equilibrium strategy prole is (ah;CEA; al;CEA) = (in; in).
Under the Constrained Equal Losses Rule:
In the subgame  CEL:
h n l in out
in
P eh + (1  s)Sh(CEL; in);
P el + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in)
P eh ; Vl;out
out Vh;out; P
e
l Vh;out; Vl;out
Table 4: Payo¤ Matrix under the Constrained Equal Losses Rule
By the denition of the constrained equal losses rule and Lemma 1, Sh(CEL; in) >
0 and Sl(CEL; in) < 0. If the outside asset pays more than the best possible expected
payo¤ that type h agents can get, the analysis is trivial since then type h agents would
never play in. Hence, we assume that V eh (CEL; in) = P
e
h + (1   s)Sh(CEL; in) >
Vh;out. This assumption implies that BRh(P; in) = in. The relationship between
P eh and Vh;out determines type h agentsbest response to type l agents playing out.
If P eh  Vh, then BRh(P; out) = in; if Ph < Vh;out, then BRh(P; out) = out. On
the other hand, type ls best response to type h agents playing in depends on the
relationship between V el (CEL; in) = P
e
l + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in) and Vl;out. If
V el (CEL; in) = P
e
l + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in)  Vl;out,
then BRl(P; in) = in; if
V el (CEL; in) = P
e
l + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in) < Vl;out,
then BRl(P; in) = out. Therefore, these inequalities characterize agentsequilibrium
actions under the constrained equal losses rule.
Equilibria in the subgame  CEL:
Case 1 If for all t 2 fl; hg, P et < Vt;out  CEL, then the unique equilibrium strategy
prole is (ah;CEL; al;CEL) = (out; out).
Case 2 If for all t 2 fl; hg, P et  Vt;out and V el (CEL; in) = P el +(1 s)Sl(CEL; in) <
Vl;out, then the unique equilibrium strategy prole is (ah;CEL; al;CEL) = (in; out).
Case 3 If for all t 2 fl; hg, P et  Vt;out and V el (CEL; in) = P el +(1 s)Sl(CEL; in) 
Vl;out, then the unique equilibrium strategy prole is (ah;CEL; al;CEL) = (in; in).
Note that in a Nash equilibrium of the subgame  CEA, if type h agents choose
to play in, type l agents also choose to play in. Similarly, in a Nash equilibrium of
the subgame  CEL, if type l agents choose to play in, type h agents also choose to
play in. Also note that, if the equilibrium of the subgame  P is the strategy prole
(ah;P ; al;P ) = (out; out), then the equilibrium strategy proles of the subgames  CEA
and  CEL are also (ah;CEA; al;CEA) = (ah;CEL; al;CEL) = (out; out).
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4.2 Characterization of All Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in  
Having nished analyzing agents behavior in all three subgames, we analyze the
companys behavior and characterize all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in   in
this subsection. As we mentioned in Section 3, the companys payo¤ function is
Vm(F ) =
P
t2fl;hg nt;inwt where nt;in is the number of type t agents played in. There-
fore, the companys decision depends on the equilibrium strategies of agents in each
subgame and the resulting level of investment. In the previous section, we analyzed
the equilibrium strategies of agents in all three subgames. Below, we list di¤erent
combinations of inequalities and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy pro-
les along with the equilibrium investment in the company. In the strategy prole
(sm; sh; sl), the rst entry refers to the companys strategy (i.e., sm 2  m) , second
to type h agents(i.e., sh 2  h), and third to type l agents(i.e., sl 2  l). Moreover,
the rst entry in a representative type t agents strategy prole refer to his equilib-
rium action in  P , the second to his equilibrium action in  CEA, and the third to his
equilibrium action in  CEL.
C1. If for all t 2 fl; hg
P et  Vt;out,
P eh + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in) < Vh;out, and
P el + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in) < Vl;out,
then given the agentsequilibrium actions in subgames  P ,  CEA, and  CEL
presented in the previous subsection, the company prefers the proportional
rule and the equilibrium investment in the company is Vm(F ) =
P
t2fl;hg ntwt.
As we showed in the previous subsection, under these parameter restrictions,
neither the constrained equal awards rule nor the constrained equal losses rule
can attract all types to invest in the company, whereas the proportional rule
can. Hence, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy prole is
(sm; sh; sl) = (P; (in; out; in); (in; in; out)).
C2. If for all t 2 fl; hg,
P et  Vt;out,
P eh + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in)  Vh;out, and
P el + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in) < Vl;out,
then given the agentsequilibrium actions in subgames  P ,  CEA, and  CEL
presented in the previous subsection, the company prefers the proportional rule
or the constrained equal awards rule to the constrained equal losses rule and
the equilibrium investment in the company is Vm(F ) =
P
t2fl;hg ntwt. As we
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showed in the previous subsection, under these parameter restrictions, both
the constrained equal awards and the proportional rules can attract all types
to invest in the company whereas the constrained equal losses rule can only
attract h types. Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy proles
are
(sm; sh; sl) = (P; (in; in; in); (in; in; out)) and
(sm; sh; sl) = (CEA; (in; in; in); (in; in; out)).
C3. If for all t 2 fl; hg,
P et  Vt;out,
P eh + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in) < Vh;out, and
P el + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in)  Vl;out,
then given the agentsequilibrium actions in subgames  P ,  CEA, and  CEL
presented in the previous subsection, the company prefers the proportional rule
or the constrained equal losses rule to the constrained equal awards rule and the
equilibrium investment in the company is Vm(F ) =
P
t2fl;hg ntwt. As we showed
in the previous subsection, under these parameter restrictions, the constrained
equal losses and the proportional rules can attract all types to invest in the
company whereas the constrained equal awards rule can only attract l types.
Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy proles are
(sm; sh; sl) = (P; (in; out; in); (in; in; in)) and
(sm; sh; sl) = (CEL; (in; out; in); (in; in; in)).
C4. If for all t 2 fl; hg,
P et  Vt;out,
P eh + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in)  Vh;out, and
P el + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in)  Vl;out,
then given the agentsequilibrium actions in subgames  P ,  CEA, and  CEL
presented in the previous subsection, the company is indi¤erent between all
three rules, and the equilibrium investment in the company is Vm(F ) =
P
t2fl;hg ntwt.
As we showed in the previous subsection, under these parameter restrictions,
all rules are equally able to attract all types to invest in the company. Hence,
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy proles are
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(sm; sh; sl) = (P; (in; in; in); (in; in; in)),
(sm; sh; sl) = (CEA; (in; in; in); (in; in; in)), and
(sm; sh; sl) = (CEL; (in; in; in); (in; in; in)).
C5. If for all t 2 fl; hg,
P et < Vt;out,
then given the agentsequilibrium actions in subgames  P ,  CEA, and  CEL
presented in the previous subsection,the company is indi¤erent between all three
rules, and the equilibrium investment in the company is Vm(F ) = 0. Since
P et < Vt;out is a necessary condition for equilibrium decisions to be (in; in),
none of the rules can attract neither of the two types to invest in the company.
Hence, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy proles are
(sm; sh; sl) = (P; (out; out; out); (out; out; out)),
(sm; sh; sl) = (CEA; (out; out; out); (out; out; out)), and
(sm; sh; sl) = (CEL; (out; out; out); (out; out; out)).
Note that in C4 and C5 above, the companys decision does not really matter.
Basically, in these cases, anything goes. As we have shown above, besides P et  Vt;out,
P eh + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in)  Vh;out and
P el + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in)  Vl;out
should be satised in C4. The interpretation of this is that neither under CEA
nor under CEL, per-capita transfers from disadvantaged type of agents to advan-
taged type of agents are signicantly high. This intuitively means that the di¤erence
between wl and wh is not signicantly large in C4.
C5 shows another situation in which the decision will not make a di¤erence. No
matter which rule the company chooses, the investment in the company will be 0.
However, this has nothing to do with the income distribution in the society. We al-
ready showed in Lemma 6 that P et  Vt;out does not contain any income distribution
parameters (e.g., nl; nh; wl and wh). Hence, the validity of this condition depends
only on the risk-return characteristics of investment alternatives. Intuitively, if the
payo¤ from the risk-free asset is su¢ ciently high, or the failure probability of the
risky investment project is su¢ ciently high (or more generally the expected return
from the risky investment is su¢ ciently low) then P et < Vt;out will hold, in which
case the companys decision cannot change the equilibrium investment in the com-
pany. We analyze the e¤ect of changes in the parameters on the equilibrium and the
corresponding investment in the company in more detail in Section 5.
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4.3 Equilibrium and Results
In Subsections 4.1 and 4.2, we analyzed agents and the companys decisions and
characterized all subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In this subsection, we present some
results which are implied by that equilibrium analysis. The following proposition
states that there always exists a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
game  .
Proposition 1 A pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of   exists.
Proof. Follows from the analyses in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2.
Below we present our main result. It shows that the proportional rule has a very
strong position in our noncooperative setting.
Theorem 1 For any bankruptcy problem (C;E) 2 eB, there always exists a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of  , which involves the proportional rule.
Proof. Notice that in all ve cases analyzed in Subsection 4.2, the subgame perfect
Nash equilibria involves the proportional rule. Since, we characterized all equilibria
in Subsection 4.2, the result immediately follows.
Notice that in C3, the subgame perfect Nash Equilibria do not involve the con-
strained equal awards rule, in C2, the subgame perfect Nash equilibria do not involve
the constrained equal losses rule and in C1, the subgame perfect Nash Equilibria do
not involve neither of these two. Hence, the statement in the main theorem is valid
only for the proportional rule.
The following corollary shows that our main result is robust with respect to the
income distribution.
Corollary 4 The statement in the main theorem is valid independent of the income
distribution.
Proof. Take any income distribution characterized by the parameters, nh, nl, wh
and wl. The condition that determines equilibrium under P is: for all t 2 fl; hg, P et 
Vt;out, which is independent of the income distribution parameters as shown in Lemma
6. Since P eh + (1   s)Sh(CEA; in)  Vh;out and P el + (1   s)Sl(CEL; in)  Vl;out
depend on income distribution parameters, the statement of the corollary cannot be
valid for CEA and CEL.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 4 provide a justication from a noncooperative point
of view for the fact that the proportional rule is frequently employed in allocating a
bankrupt companys assets to shareholders.
By Corollary 4, even if there is an uncertainty about the income distribution
(i.e., the company does not know the income distribution for sure) statements in the
Theorem 1 are still valid. In fact, for probability distributions that assign non-zero
probability to all possible income distributions, the proportional rule would be the
unique optimal strategy for an expected-payo¤maximizing company. Also, note that
by Theorem 1 and Corollary 4, the average investment in the company under the
proportional rule is largest among the three rules.
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4.4 Extension to a Larger Set of Rules
In this subsection, we show that our results remain valid if we enlarge the set of rules
we use in our model. Our rst candidate is the Talmud rule since it is one of the
prominent bankruptcy rules, along with three rules analyzed above and satises a
large set of "desirable" properties (see Herrero & Villar, 2001 and Thomson, 2006).
Aumann & Maschler (1985), in a seminal article, propose the Talmud rule as a
consistent extension of the contested garment rule.
Denition 5 (Talmud Rule) For all (C;E) 2 eB, and all j 2 N ,
TALj(C;E) 

minf cj2 ; tg if E 
P
i2N
ci
2
cj  minf cj2 ; tg if E 
P
i2N
ci
2
where t solves
P
i2N TALi(C;E) = E.
Note that the Talmud rule coincides with the constrained equal awards rule if
E Pi2N ci2 and with the constrained equal losses rule if E Pi2N ci2 (see Moreno-
Ternero & Villar, 2006). When E =
P
i2N
ci
2 , the proportional rule, the constrained
equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule lead to the same awards vector.
In our model, the relative value of E with respect to
P
i2N
ci
2 is completely determined
by values of r and rf . For instance, E <
P
i2N
ci
2 corresponds to 1 < r   2rf ,
E =
P
i2N
ci
2 to r = 1 and rf = 0, and E >
P
i2N
ci
2 to r   2rf < 1. Since we do
not allow rf < 0 or r > 1, E <
P
i2N
ci
2 is not possible. Therefore, the Talmud rule
coincides with the constrained equal losses rule in our model, which trivially implies
that including the Talmud rule does not change our results.
Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2006) generalize the Talmud rule by introducing the
TAL-family of rules, which contains the Talmud, constrained equal awards and the
constrained equal losses rules as special cases.
Denition 6 (TAL-family) The TAL-family consists of all rules of the following
form: For some  2 [0; 1], for all (E;C) 2 eB and for all i 2 N ,
F i (C;E) =

minfci; g if E 
P
i2N ci
maxfci; ci   g if E 
P
i2N ci
where  and  solve
P
i2N F

i (C;E) = E.
Note that F = CEL for  = 0, F = CEA for  = 1 and F = T for  = 1=2: On
the other hand, P is not a member of the TAL-family. Moreover, for all  2 [0; 12 ],
F  coincides with the constrained equal losses rule in our model and for all  2 [12 ; 1],
F  coincides with the constrained equal awards rule if E  Pi2N ci and with the
constrained equal losses rule if E Pi2N ci (see Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2006).
Now, we change the game by including all members of the TAL-family along with
the proportional rule in the strategy space of the company. Therefore,   has innitely
many subgames which are  P and, for all  2 [0; 1],  .
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Theorem 2 For any bankruptcy problem (E;C) 2 eB, there always exists a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of   with the proportional rule and the member of the TAL-
family parametrized by  = 1+rf1+r .
Proof. Given r and rf , EP
i2N ci
=
1+rf
1+r 2 [12 ; 1). There exists a  2 [12 ; 1] such that
 = 1+rf1+r . The awards vector under rule F
 coincides with the awards vector under
the proportional rule. Any other member of the TAL-family coincides either with
the constrained equal awards rule or the constrained equal losses rule given r and rf .
Therefore, the result follows from Theorem 1.
5 Comparative Static Analysis
In this section, we conduct comparative static analyses on the risk-return parameters
and income distribution parameters. We show how the equilibrium investment in the
company responds to changes in these parameters. First of all, we present the closed
form versions of the inequalities that determine the equilibrium under each rule. This
will help us in conducting comparative static analyses.
Recall that we have only (in; in) and (out; out) as (representative) subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium strategy proles. Therefore, in the following we provide the
closed form expressions of the inequalities that lead to these subgame perfect equi-
libria.
The Proportional Rule:
For (in; in) equilibrium,
P et  Vt;out
is required. It can be written explicitly as
s(1 + r)wt + (1  s)(1 + rf )wt  (1 + r)wt
sr + rf   srf  r
s(r   rf )  r   rf
s  r   rf
r   rf . (7)
Obviously, s <
r rf
r rf leads to (out; out) equilibrium. Moreover, recall that s <
r rf
r rf
also leads to (out; out) equilibrium under CEA and CEL.
The Constrained Equal Awards Rule:
For (in; in) equilibrium
P et  Vt;out and
P eh + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in)  Vh;out
24
is required. We consider two cases to express the second inequality explicitly under
CEA:
(a-1) If ch > cl > cea, then P eh + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in)  Vh;out can be written as,
s(1 + r)wh + (1  s)(1 + rf )wh + (1  s) nl
nh + nh
[(1 + rf )(wl  wh)]  (1 + r)wh,
which is equal to
nl
nl + nh
 wh
wh   wl
sr + (1  s)rf   r
(1  s)(1 + rf ) . (8)
(a-2) If ch > cea  cl, then P eh + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in)  Vh;out can be written as,
s(1 + r)wh + (1  s)(1 + rf )wh + (1  s) nl
nh
(rf   r)wl  (1 + r)wh,
which is equal to
nl
nh
 wh
wl
sr + (1  s)rf   r
(1  s)(r   rf ) . (9)
The Constrained Equal Losses Rule:
For (in; in) equilibrium
P et  Vt;out and
P el + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in)  Vl;out
is required. We consider two cases to express the second inequality explicitly under
CEL:
(b-1) If ch > cl > cel, then P el + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in)  Vl;out can be written as,
s(1 + r)wl + (1  s)(1 + rf )wl + (1  s) nh
nh + nl
[(r   rf )(wl   wh)]  (1 + r)wl,
which is equal to
nh
nh + nl
 wl
wh   wl
sr + (1  s)rf   r
(1  s)(r   rf ) . (10)
(b-2) If ch > cea  cl, then P el + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in)  Vl;out can be written as,
s(1 + r)wl  (1 + r)wl,
which is equal to
s  1 + r
1 + r
. (11)
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Note that s  r rfr rf is already implicitly embedded in (8), (9), (10) and (11)
also implies it. Hence practically, we do not have two conditions determining the
(in; in) equilibrium under CEA and CEL. Below, we present a table consisting
of parameters r; rf ; r; s; nl; nh; wl; and wh and the e¤ects of changes in those on
the inequalities that determine the subgame perfect equilibrium investment in the
company. In particular, + in a cell means that the inequality in the corresponding
column will still be valid after an increase in the respective parameter and   in a cell
means that the inequality in the corresponding column might not be valid after an
increase.
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
r + + + + +
rf + + + + no change
r          
s + + + + +
nl no change     + no change
nh no change + +   no change
wl no change +   + no change
wh no change   +   no change
Table 5: Comparative Static Analysis on the Set of SPNE
The following proposition shows the relationship between risk-return parameters
and the equilibrium investment in the company.
Proposition 2 A change in r, rf , r and  can lead to only two types of movements
in the equilibrium investment in the company:
(i) Either the equilibrium investment in the company decreases from
P
t2fl;hg ntwt to
0, or
(ii) the equilibrium investment in the company increases from 0 to
P
t2fl;hg ntwt.
Proof. In all subgame perfect Nash equilibria, there are only two possible levels of
investment: 0 and
P
t2fl;hg ntwt. Hence, if a change in r, rf , r and  causes a change
in the equilibrium investment it can be either a movement from
P
t2fl;hg ntwt to 0,
or a movement from 0 to
P
t2fl;hg ntwt.
Proposition 3 An increase in r, rf or s can never decrease the equilibrium invest-
ment in the company.
Proof. The proof is simple and hence omitted. It follows from the fact that agents
expected payo¤ from playing in is increasing in r, rf and s.
This result also shows that taxes on r and/or rf can be used as a policy tool by
the government to increase the shareholders in the company. By decreasing the taxes,
the government can increase the number of shareholders as well as the investment in
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the company. On the other hand, the return from the risk-free outside asset (r) enters
all inequalities above from the right side with a positive sign. Therefore, an increase
in r increases the attractiveness of the risk-free asset i.e. playing out. Accordingly,
the equilibrium investment in the company weakly decreases as a result of an increase
in r. Similar to the policy implication about r and rf above, taxes on r can also be
used as a policy tool. The government can increase the investment in the company
by increasing the taxes on the risk-free asset.
The following proposition shows the relationship between income distribution
parameters and the equilibrium investment in the company.
Proposition 4 Decreases in nl, nh, wl and wh can never increase the equilibrium
investment in the company.
Proof. The proof is simple and follows from the following facts:
(i) The proportional rule is always a part of the equilibrium.
(ii) The condition determining the equilibrium strategies under the proportional rule
is independent of the income distribution parameters (i.e., nl, nh, wl and wh) as
shown in Lemma 6.
(iii) If P et < Vt;out, the equilibrium investment in the company is 0 and does not
change due to any change in nl, nh, wl and wh.
(iv) If P et  Vt;out, the equilibrium investment in the company under P is
P
t2fl;hg ntwt.
Since the change in
P
t2fl;hg ntwt with respect to a change in nl, nh, wl or wh, a
decrease in any of these parameters decreases the equilibrium investment in the com-
pany.
Needless to say, increases in nl, nh, wl and wh can never decrease the equilibrium
investment in the company.
The following corollary shows the relationship between the impact a change in
parameters has on the equilibrium investment in the company under P and the impact
it has on the subgame perfect equilibrium level of investment in the company.
Corollary 5 The subgame perfect equilibrium level of investment in the company
does not change as a result of a change in parameters if the equilibrium investment
in the company under P does not change.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that the proportional rule is the only rule that
is always a part of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Hence, if the equilibrium
investment in the company under P does not change as a result of a change in
parameters, the subgame perfect equilibrium level of investment in the company
does not change.
This corollary implies that if the equilibrium investment in the company under
CEA or CEL drops as a result of a change in some parameter, this does not neces-
sarily mean that the subgame perfect equilibrium level of investment in the company
drops, since P might still be leading to nlwl + nhwh investment in the company. For
example, as a result of a change in some parameter the investment in the company
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under CEA (CEL) might drop from nlwl + nhwh to nlwl (nhwh), but under P it
might be still nlwl+nhwh. In that case, the subgame perfect equilibrium investment
in the company is still nlwl+nhwh. The equilibrium investment in the company drops
only if s  r rfr rf changes to s <
r rf
r rf as a result of a change in some parameter.
Hence, there are still two possible equilibrium investment levels: nlwl + nhwh and 0.
Similarly, the equilibrium investment may not rise as a result of a change in some
parameter, even if it causes an increase in the investment under CEA or CEL.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss our assumptions, the way we set up our model, our results,
extension ideas and possible future research. For instance, one might notice that the
return rate determination is exogenous in our model. Moreover, we assume identical
risk-attitudes (i.e., risk neutrality) for all agents. Obviously, these are simplifying
assumptions. Our main purpose in this research is to integrate the models of bank-
ruptcy problem into a noncooperative game theoretical model that involves strategic
decision-making under uncertainty. By endogenizing agentsdecisions, we derive a
noncooperative support for the proportional rule. Embedding the simple bankruptcy
model into a strategic context requires some simplications such as the ones we men-
tioned above. Below, we discuss what would happen if we did not make some of the
assumptions.
Nonexistence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Under Di¤erent Risk Attitudes: If
we assume that the high type agents are risk-neutral and the low type agents are
risk-averse, we show that a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium might not exist under
some parameter values. Below, we explain the dynamics of the non-existence result
in more detail.
The reason of non-existence under di¤erent risk attitudes (in particular, risk neu-
tral type h agents and risk averse type l agents) is the high degree of conict of
interest and the availability of an escape option (i.e., the risk-free asset) causing
cyclicity. When we analyze the parameter conditions under which there is no pure
strategy equilibrium, we see that the cost that is imposed on type h agents (type l
agents) under CEA (CEL) can be understood as the level of conict of interest. For
example, under CEA, if ch > cea > cl, then the term
nl
nh
(rf   r)wl shows per-type
h-capita transfer to type l agents. A quick look at the term shows that if nh is high,
then per-type h-capita transfer is low, if nl is high it is high and if (rf r) is high, it is
again high. Therefore, for some parameter values, under CEA, type h agents do not
play in against type l agents playing in. Hence, their best response to type l agents
playing in is to play out. And type l agentsbest response to type h agents playing
out is also out. However, type h agentsbest response to type l agents playing out is
to play in and type l agentsbest response to type h agents playing in is to play in.
Hence, the process does not stop at an equilibrium. In the following, we construct
an example in which there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium under CEA.
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Example 2 Assume that nl = nh = 1, wl = 10, wh = 100, r = 0:8, rf = 0:2, and
r = 0:61. Moreover, recall that type h agent is risk neutral whereas type l agent is
risk-averse. This implies that type l agent rejects fair gambles. Then, we can simply
calculate the expected payo¤s for the type h agent as
P eh = (0:7)(1 + 0:8)100 + (0:3)(1 + 0:2)100 = 162 and
CEAeh = (0:7)(1 + 0:8)100 + (0:3)114 = 160:2.
Denote the utility function of the type l agent as U(:). Since
Vh;out = 161,
Vl;out = 16:1, and
CEAl = 18
the payo¤ matrix can be written as
h n l in out
in 160:2; U(18) 162; U(16:1)
out 161; (0:7)U(18) + (0:3)U(12) 161; U(16:1)
Risk-aversion implies that (0:7)U(18) + (0:3)U(12) < U(16:2). If (0:7)U(18) +
(0:3)U(12) < U(16:1) is also valid, then we do not have pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium in this game. BRh(in) = out, BRl(out) = out, BRh(out) = in and BRl(in) =
in. Hence, there is a cycle. As the reader might realize, the statement "P eh  Vh;out if
and only if U(Pl)  Vl;out" is not valid anymore, which causes the cycle. The nonex-
istence results Kibris & Kibris (2008) have under CEA in a similar setup conrms
our expectations.
Nonexistence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Under Di¤erent Outside Asset Pay-
o¤s: We assumed that the risk-free asset brings the same payo¤ to both types of
agents in case they invest in it. This is an unbiased (neutral) assumption to make.
However there might be real life instances in which there are di¤erent risk-free assets
available to di¤erent types of agents (e.g., the risk-free asset available to h agents
might pay higher (lower) than the risk-free asset available to type l agents). In that
case, the companys decision in equilibrium might be di¤erent than the one we de-
scribed above. However, a problem with this more general approach is that, again, it
can bring non-existence results for some parameter values. Hence, we kept our neu-
tral assumption that risk-free asset pays the same return rate to all agents. In the
following, we construct an example where there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in the subgame under CEA.
Example 3 Assume that nl = nh = 1, wl = 10, wh = 100, r = 0:8, rf = 0:2,
rh = 0:61 and rl = 0:63. Then, we can simply calculate the expected payo¤s as
P eh = (0:7)(1 + 0:8)100 + (0:3)(1 + 0:2)100 = 162,
CEAeh = (0:7)(1 + 0:8)100 + (0:3)114 = 160:2,
P el = (0:7)(1 + 0:8)10 + (0:3)(1 + 0:2)10 = 16:2, and
CEAel = (0:7)(1 + 0:8)10 + (0:3)18 = 18.
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Risk-free asset brings payo¤s Vh;out = 161 and Vl;out = 16:3. Hence, the payo¤matrix
can be written as
h n l in out
in 160:2; 18 162; 16:3
out 161; 16:2 161; 16:3
As the reader can notice, type h agent does not play in against type l agents
playing in. Hence, his best response to type l agent playing in is to play out. And
type l agents best response to type h agent playing out is also out. However, type
h agents best response to type l agent playing out is to play in and type l agents
best response to type h agent playing in is to play in. Hence, the process does not
stop at an equilibrium. As the reader might realize, it is again the invalidity of the
statement "P eh  Vh;out if and only if P el  Vl;out", which causes the cycle.
Individual Optimization on the Level of Investment: In this paper, we assume that
individuals do not maximize their expected payo¤s by choosing the amount of money
they want to invest in the company and in the savings account. They either invest in
the company or deposit their money in a savings account. However, if we allowed them
to optimize under risk-neutrality assumption, we would have corner solutions where
each agent, again, will either fully invest in the company or in the savings account.
Hence, our assumption, ex-post, is not very restrictive under risk-neutrality.
Below, we discuss some other aspects of our model such as distributive properties
of the bankruptcy rules in bankruptcy problems with endogenous estates and possible
extensions.
Distributive Properties: In a follow-up paper (see Karagozoglu, 2008), we analyze
some distributive properties such as minimal rights rst, securement of initial invest-
ments, initial investments rst, reasonable lower bounds on awards, and reasonable
lower bounds on losses in the class of bankruptcy problems with endogenous es-
tates. We show that the proportional rule receives more support compared to the
constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses rules. Some normative
properties that were not satised by the proportional rule in the general class of
bankruptcy problems are satised by this rule in the class of bankruptcy problems
with an endogenous estate. These changes are mostly due to the fact that estate and
claims are not independent in this class. As a result, certain values of the estate for
which the proportional rule does not satisfy certain properties are eliminated in this
class of bankruptcy problems.
Bankruptcy Laws and Sequential Priority Rules: We observe that many bankruptcy
laws apply certain sequential priority rules in the liquidation of bankrupt companies
assets. Priority classes are dened on the basis of seniority (e.g., founding stock-
holders or new stockholders), status of creditors (e.g., stockholder or bondholder) or
status of claims (e.g., secured or unsecured) etc. The American bankruptcy law is a
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frequently quoted example in which priority classes are federal government (taxes),
trustees (administrative expenses of the trustee) and two kinds of creditors (secured
and unsecured claims). These rules and the constrained equal awards and constrained
equal losses rules have a commonality: in all of these rules, there are people favored
by the rule (i.e., receiving transfers) and there are people disfavored by the rule (i.e.,
making transfers). In this paper, we show that the strength of the proportional
rule stems from its "neutrality" (zero transfers as a benchmark). Therefore, if we
slightly modify our model to capture priority criteria such as seniority or status,
there will, again, exist some parameter values for which, some agents do not invest in
the company in equilibrium under the sequential priority rules. Loosely speaking, the
proportional rule will outperform sequential priority rules in attracting investment to
the company. Moreover, an important fact, which is in conformity with our results
is that the proportional rule is applied in the liquidation process within each priority
class in sequential priority rules.
Extension to T > 2 Types: Extension of our results to T > 2 types is a work in
progress. We have some preliminary results, but this extension is not trivial at all
since proving the comparative static results and the symmetry result is more complex
than in the case of 2 types. The reason is that in the case of T > 2 types, a change in
the number type t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg agents can cause an identity switch for some other
types (some types might become transfer-makers and/or some other types might
become transfer-receivers).
Competition Among Multiple Companies: In most cases, there are more than one
company competing for the same group of investors in real life. In a follow up paper,
we plan to introduce competition into the model analyzed here. This makes our model
more realistic and also enable us to check the robustness of the results obtained in this
paper. Preliminary results show that the income distribution has a greater impact
on equilibrium than it has in this paper.
Increasing Returns and/or Decreasing Risk: In certain real-life circumstances, one
might suggest that an increase in the investment volume can lead to an increase in the
return rate (e.g., the investment project involves increasing returns to capital) and/or
a decrease in the rate of risk (e.g., a higher level of capital increases the likelihood of
success). If we incorporate these two possibilities, we expect that our results would
quantitatively change. The relative (with respect to the proportional rule) positions
of the constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses rules would improve.
However, we expect no qualitative change in the results, i.e., the proportional rule
would still have an advantage over others.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a new class of bankruptcy problems, which have an
empirical appeal. In these bankruptcy problems, the value of the estate to be allo-
cated to agents is endogenous and depends on agentsinvestment decisions. This is
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what we observe in many real life cases. For instance the amount to be allocated by
a rm to its shareholders/stockholders may depend on the initial amount of money
borrowed from them. Moreover, in line with some recent suggestions in favor of a
more liberal bankruptcy law, which provides a menu of bankruptcy procedures and
allows companies to select among them (see Hart, 2000), we allow the company in
our model to choose from a menu of bankruptcy rules that consists of three well-
known rules, i.e., the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule and the
constrained equal losses rule. Companys objective in choosing a bankruptcy rule is
to maximize the investment volume, which would lead to maximum prot. Agents
observe the choice made by the company and decide whether to lend money to the
company (risky investment) or deposit their money in a savings account (risk-free
investment).
Our results show that the proportional rule receives a strong and robust support in
this setting. There always exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which involves
the proportional rule. A direct implication is that there is no equilibrium in which
the proportional rule leads to a lower level of investment volume than the other rules.
This result is independent of the income distribution in the society and holds even
under one-sided uncertainty on income distribution (i.e., the company does not know
the income distribution perfectly). In fact, for probability distributions that assign
non-zero probability to all possible income distributions, the proportional rule would
be the unique optimal strategy for an expected payo¤ maximizing company. We
also extend the menu of rules to include a subset of the TAL-family and show that
results do not change a lot. This is an important extension since the TAL-family
contains innitely many rules some of which are the Talmud rule, the constrained
equal awards rule and the constrained equal losses rule. Our results provide, at least,
a partial explanation from a strategic point of view for the fact that the proportional
rule is frequently used in the liquidation process of a bankrupt companys assets
(e.g., Hart, 2000 and Kaminski, 2006). Finally, we also provide a noncooperative
justication for the normative idea proposed by the equity theory of Selten (1978).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper which models the bankruptcy
rule determination as a sequential game between lender (company) and borrowers
(agents). It is also the rst paper, which embeds the classical bankruptcy problem
in a decision-making under uncertainty environment.
32
References
[1] Araujo, A. P. & Páscoa, M. R. (2002) "Bankruptcy in a model of unsecured
claims", Economic Theory, 20(3), pp. 455 - 481.
[2] Aumann, R. & Maschler, M. (1985) "Game theoretic analysis of a bank-
ruptcy problem from the Talmud", Journal of Economic Theory, 36(2), pp. 195
- 213.
[3] Bergantiños, G. & Sanchez, E. (2002) "The proportional rule for problems
with constraints and claims", Mathematical Social Sciences, 43(2), pp. 225 - 249.
[4] Chambers, C. P. & Thomson, W. (2002) "Group order preservation and
the proportional rule for the adjudication of conicting claims", Mathematical
Social Sciences, 44(3), pp. 235 - 252.
[5] Chang, C. & Hu, C-C. (2008) "A non-cooperative interpretation of the f -
just rules of bankruptcy problems", Games and Economic Behavior, 63(1), pp.
133 - 144..
[6] Ching, S. & Kakkar, V. (2001) "A market approach to the bankruptcy
problem, mimeo, City University of Hong Kong.
[7] Chun, Y. (1988) "The proportional solution for rights problem",Mathematical
Social Sciences, 15(3), pp. 231 - 246.
[8] Chun, Y. (1989) "A noncooperative justication for egalitarian surplus shar-
ing", Mathematical Social Sciences, 17(3), pp. 245 - 261.
[9] Chun, Y. & Lee, J. (2007) "On the convergence of the random arrival rule in
large claims problems", International Journal of Game Theory, 36(2), pp. 259 -
273.
[10] Curiel, I., Maschler, M. & Tijs, S. H. (1987) "Bankruptcy games",
Zeitschrift fur Operations Research, 31(5), pp. A143 - A159.
[11] Dagan, N. & Volij, O. (1993) "The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative
bargaining approach", Mathematical Social Sciences, 26(3), pp. 287 - 297.
[12] Dagan, N., Serrano, R. & Volij, O. (1997) "A noncooperative view of
consistent bankruptcy rules", Games and Economic Behavior, 18(1), pp. 55 -
72.
[13] De Frutos, M. A. (1999) "Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy prob-
lem", Review of Economic Design, 4(3), pp. 255 - 272.
[14] Gächter, S. & Riedl, A. (2005) "Moral property rights in bargaining with
infeasible claims", Management Science, 51(2), pp. 249 - 263.
33
[15] Gächter, S. & Riedl, A. (2006) "Dividing justly in bargaining problems with
claims", Social Choice and Welfare, 27(3), pp. 571 - 594.
[16] García-Jurado, I., González-Díaz, J. & Villar, A. (2006) "A noncoop-
erative approach to bankruptcy problems", Spanish Economic Review, 8(3), pp.
189 - 197.
[17] Hart, O. (2000) "Di¤erent approaches to bankruptcy", NBER Working Paper
# 7921.
[18] Herrero, C. (2003) "Equal awards vs. equal losses: duality in bankruptcy",
In: Sertel MR, Koray S (eds.) Adv Econ Des. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New
York.
[19] Herrero, C., Moreno-Ternero, J. D. & Ponti, G. (2006) "On the adju-
dication of conicting claims: an experimental study", CORE Discussion Paper
2006/62.
[20] Herrero, C. & Villar, A. (2001) "The three musketeers: four classical solu-
tions to bankruptcy problems", Mathematical Social Sciences, 42(3), pp. 307 -
328.
[21] Hougaard, J. L. & Østerdal, L. P. (2005) "Inequality preserving rationing",
Economics Letters, 87(3), pp. 355 - 360.
[22] Ju, B-G. (2003) "Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems",
Review of Economic Design, 8(2), pp. 205 - 215.
[23] Ju, B-G., Miyagawa, E. & Sakai, T. (2007) "Non-manipulable division
rules in claims problems and generalizations", Journal of Economic Theory,
132(1), pp. 1 - 26.
[24] Kaminski, M. M. (2006) "Parametric rationing methods", Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 54(1), pp. 115 - 133.
[25] Karagozoglu, E. (2008) "Distributive concerns in the bankruptcy problem
with an endogenous estate", mimeo, Maastricht University.
[26] Kibris, O. & Kibris, A. (2008) "On the investment implications of bank-
ruptcy laws", mimeo, Sabanci University.
[27] Moreno-Ternero, J. D. (2002) "Noncooperative support for the proportional
rule in bankruptcy problems", mimeo, Universidad de Alicante.
[28] Moreno-Ternero, J. D. (2006a) "Proportionality and non-manipulability in
bankruptcy problems", International Game Theory Review, 8(1), pp. 127 - 139.
[29] Moreno-Ternero, J. D. (2006b) "Proportional rule for multi-issue bank-
ruptcy problems", CORE Discussion Paper # 2006/76.
34
[30] Moreno-Ternero, J. D. & Villar, A. (2006) "The TAL-family of rules for
bankruptcy problems", Social Choice and Welfare, 27(2), pp. 231 - 249.
[31] Moulin, H. (2000) "Priority rules and other asymmetric rationing methods,"
Econometrica, 68(3), pp. 643 - 684.
[32] Moulin, H. (2002) "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing" in: Arrow K., Sen
A., Suzumura K. (eds.) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 1. Elsevier,
Amsterdam.
[33] ONeill, B. (1982) "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud", Math-
ematical Social Sciences, 2(4), pp. 345 - 371.
[34] Selten, R. (1978) "The equity principle in economic behavior", in Gottinger
H.W. & Leinfellner W. (eds.) Decision Theory and Social E¤ects. Kluwer, Dor-
drecht, pp. 289 - 301.
[35] Thomson, W. (2003) "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy
and taxation problems: a survey", Mathematical Social Sciences, 45(3), pp. 249
- 297.
[36] Thomson, W. (2006) How to Divide When There isnt Enough; From the
Talmud to Game Theory, unpublished manuscript.
[37] Young, P. (1985) "Cost Allocation" in: Young P. (eds.) Fair Allocation. Pro-
ceedings of Symposia in Applied Mathematics, vol. 33, Providence RI: The Amer-
ican Mathematical Society.
[38] Yaari, M. E. & Bar-Hillel, M. (1984) "On dividing justly", Social Choice
and Welfare, 1(1), pp. 1 - 24.
35
Appendix:
A - Comparative Static Analysis Calculations
Closed Form Expressions for Transfers
Sh(CEA; in) =
nl(rf   r)wl
nh
if ch > cea  cl
Sh(CEA; in) =
nl
nh + nl
(1 + rf )(wl   wh) if ch > cl  cea
Sl(CEA; in) = (r   rf )wl if ch > cea  cl
Sl(CEA; in) =
nl
nh + nl
(1 + rf )(wh   wl) if ch > cl  cea
Sl(CEL; in) =
nh
nh + nl
(r   rf )(wl   wh) if ch > cl > cel
Sl(CEL; in) =  (1 + rf )wl if ch > cel  cl
Sh(CEL; in) =
nl
nh + nl
(r   rf )(wh   wl) if ch > cl > cel
Sh(CEL; in) =
nl
nh
(1 + rf )wl if ch > cel  cl
Comparative Static Analysis Calculations
Since nh;in and nl;in are discrete variables, we cannot look at derivatives. Hence,
we look at di¤erences. Now, we dene the di¤erence operator. The change in St(:; :; :)
with respect to a unit change in nt;in is denoted by
4St(F;nh;in;nl;in)
4nt;in .
Sh(CEA; in) =
nl(rf   r)wl
nh
if ch > cea  cl
 Change in Sh(CEA; in) with respect to nl, if ch > cea  cl
4Sh(CEA;in)
4nl =
wl(rf r)
nh
< 0
 Change in Sh(CEA; in) with respect to nh, if ch > cea  cl
4Sh(CEA;in)
4nh =
 nlwl(rf r)
(nh)2
or  nlwl(rf r)(nh+1)nh > 0
 Change in Sh(CEA; in) with respect to wl, if ch > cea  cl
@Sh(CEA;in)
@wl
=
nl(rf r)
nh
< 0
 Change in Sh(CEA; in) with respect to wh, if ch > cea  cl
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@Sh(CEA;in)
@wh
= 0
Sh(CEA; in) =
nl
nh + nl
(1 + rf )(wl   wh) if ch > cl  cea
 Change in Sh(CEA; in) with respect to nl, if ch > cl  cea
4Sh(CEA;in)
4nl =
nh(1+rf )(wl wh)
(nh+nl)2
or nh(1+rf )(wl wh)(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) < 0
 Change in Sh(CEA; in) with respect to nh, if ch > cl  cea
4Sh(CEA;in)
4nh =  
nl(1+rf )(wl wh)
(nh+nl)2
or   nl(1+rf )(wl wh)(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) > 0
 Change in Sh(CEA; in) with respect to wl, if ch > cl  cea
@Sh(CEA;in)
@wl
= nlnh+nl (1 + rf ) > 0
 Change in Sh(CEA; in) with respect to wh, if ch > cl  cea
@Sh(CEA;in)
@wh
=   nlnh+nl (1 + rf ) < 0
Sl(CEA; in) = (r   rf )wl if ch > cea  cl
 Change in Sl(CEA; in) with respect to nl, if ch > cea  cl
4Sl(CEA;in)
4nl = 0
 Change in Sl(CEA; in) with respect to nh, if ch > cea  cl
4Sl(CEA;in)
4nh = 0
 Change in Sl(CEA; in) with respect to wl, if ch > cea  cl
@Sl(CEA;in)
@wl
= (r   rf ) > 0
 Change in Sl(CEA; in) with respect to wh, if ch > cea  cl
@Sl(CEA;in)
@wh
= 0
Sl(CEA; in) =
nh
nh + nl
(1 + rf )(wh   wl) if ch > cl  cea
 Change in Sl(CEA; in) with respect to nl, if ch > cl  cea
4Sl(CEA;in)
4nl =  
nh(1+rf )(wh wl)
(nh+nl)2
or   nh(1+rf )(wh wl)(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) < 0
 Change in Sl(CEA; in) with respect to nh, if ch > cl  cea
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4Sl(CEA;in)
4nh =
nl(1+rf )(wh wl)
(nh+nl)2
or nl(1+rf )(wh wl)(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) > 0
 Change in Sl(CEA; in) with respect to wl, if ch > cl  cea
@Sl(CEA;in)
@wl
=   nhnh+nl (1 + rf ) < 0
 Change in Sl(CEA; in) with respect to wh, if ch > cl  cea
@Sl(CEA;in)
@wh
= nhnh+nl (1 + rf ) > 0
Sl(CEL; in) =
nh
nh + nl
(r   rf )(wl   wh) if ch > cl > cel
 Change in Sl(CEL; in) with respect to nl, if ch > cl > cel
4Sl(CEL;in)
4nl =  
nh(wl wh)(r rf )
(nh+nl)2
or   nh(wl wh)(r rf )(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) > 0
 Change in Sl(CEL; in) with respect to nh, if ch > cl > cel
4Sl(CEL;in)
4nh =
nl(wl wh)(r rf )
(nh+nl)2
or nl(wl wh)(r rf )(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) < 0
 Change in Sl(CEL; in) with respect to wl, if ch > cl > cel
@Sl(CEL;in)
@wl
= nhnh+nl (r   rf ) > 0
 Change in Sl(CEL; in) with respect to wh, if ch > cl > cel
@Sl(CEL;in)
@wh
=   nhnh+nl (r   rf ) < 0
Sl(CEL; in) =  (1 + rf )wl if ch > cel  cl
 Change in Sl(CEL; in) with respect to nl, if ch > cel  cl
4Sl(CEL;in)
4nl = 0
 Change in Sl(CEL; in) with respect to nh, if ch > cel  cl
4Sl(CEL;in)
4nh = 0
 Change in Sl(CEL; in) with respect to wl, if ch > cel  cl
@Sl(CEL;in)
@wl
=  (1 + rf ) < 0
 Change in Sl(CEL; in) with respect to wh, if ch > cel  cl
@Sl(CEL;in)
@wh
= 0
Sh(CEL; in) =
nl
nh + nl
(r   rf )(wh   wl) if ch > cl > cel
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 Change in Sh(CEL; in) with respect to nl, if ch > cl > cel
4Sh(CEL;in)
4nl =
nh(wh wl)(r rf )
(nh+nl)2
or nh(wh wl)(r rf )(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) > 0
 Change in Sh(CEL; in) with respect to nh, if ch > cl > cel
4Sh(CEL;in)
4nh =  
nl(wh wl)(r rf )
(nh+nl)2
or   nl(wh wl)(r rf )(nh+nl+1)(nh+nl) < 0
 Change in Sh(CEL; in) with respect to wl, if ch > cl > cel
@Sh(CEL;in)
@wl
=   nlnh+nl (r   rf ) < 0
 Change in Sh(CEL; in) with respect to wh, if ch > cl > cel
@Sh(CEL;in)
@wh
= nlnh+nl (r   rf ) > 0
Sh(CEL; in) =
nl
nh
(1 + rf )wl if ch > cel  cl
 Change in Sh(CEL; in) with respect to nl, if ch > cel  cl
4Sh(CEL;in)
4nl =
(1+rf )wl
nh
> 0
 Change in Sh(CEL; in) with respect to nh, if ch > cel  cl
4Sh(CEL;in)
4nh =  
nl(1+rf )wl
(nh)2
or   nl(1+rf )wl(nh+1)(nh) < 0
 Change in Sh(CEL; in) with respect to wl, if ch > cel  cl
@Sh(CEL;in)
@wl
= nlnh (1 + rf ) > 0
 Change in Sh(CEL; in) with respect to wh, if ch > cel  cl
@Sh(CEL;in)
@wh
= 0
B - Proofs of Preparatory Results
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Assume that the number of claimants for whom cj  cea
is k < n. It immediately follows that for all cj  cea, CEAj(C;E) = cj . Therefore,
for all cj  cea, since Pj(C;E) < cj , we get CEAj(C;E) > Pj(C;E). We now
analyze the case, cj > cea. For all such claimants, CEAj(C;E) = cea. This can be
written as
CEAj(C;E) = cea =
E  Pki=1 ci
n  k .
Furthermore, we know that
Pj(C;E) = cj
EP
i2N ci
.
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To nd out whether there exists c, which satises the statement in the lemma, we
check the equality,
E  Pki=1 ci
n  k = c
 EP
i2N ci
.
This can be rewritten as
c =
(E  Pki=1 ci)Pi2N ci
(n  k)E = cea
P
i2N ci
E
. (12)
Since (E  Pki=1 ci) > 0, c > 0. Moreover, sinceP
i2N ci
E
> 1
(by the denition of bankruptcy), we have c > cea. Now, pick an agent j such that
cea < cj . Then,
cj Q c , Pj(C;E) = cj EP
i2N ci
Q c EP
i2N ci
.
Using (12), we can rewrite this as
cj Q c , Pj(C;E) = cj EP
i2N ci
Q cea
P
i2N ci
E
EP
i2N ci
= cea = CEAj(C;E).
Thus, the result follows.
(ii) Assume that the number of claimants for whom cj  cel is ek < n. It immediately
follows that for all cj  cel, CELj(C;E) = 0. Therefore, for all cj  cel, since
0 < Pj(C;E), we get CELj(C;E) < Pj(C;E). We now analyze the case cj > cel.
For all such claimants, CELj(C;E) = cj   cel > 0, where cel can be written as
cel =
Pn
i=ek+1 ci   E
n  ek .
Therefore, for all cj > cel, CELj(C;E) can be written as
CELj(C;E) = cj  
Pn
i=ek+1 ci   E
n  ek .
Furthermore, we know that
Pj(C;E) = cj
EP
i2N ci
.
To nd out whether there exists ec, which satises the statement in the lemma, we
check the equality,
ec  Pni=ek+1 ci   E
n  ek = ec EPi2N ci .
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This can be rewritten as
ec = (Pni=ek+1 ci   E)Pi2N ci
(n  ek)(Pi2N ci   E) = cel
P
i2N ciP
i2N ci   E
> 0. (13)
Moreover, since P
i2N ciP
i2N ci   E
> 1,
we have ec > cel. Now pick an agent j such that cj > cel. Then,
cj Q ec, Pj(C;E) = cj EP
i2N ci
Q ec EP
i2N ci
.
Using (13), we can rewrite this as
cj Q ec, Pj(C;E) = cj EP
i2N ci
Q cel
P
i2N ciP
i2N ci   E
EP
i2N ci
= cel
EP
i2N ci   E
.
We know that an agent j with a claim cj > cel receives a payo¤, CELj(C;E) =
cj   cel and at cj = ec,
CELj(C;E) = cj   cel = cel EP
i2N ci   E
= Pj(C;E).
Moreover, at cj = cel
Pj(C;E) = cel
EP
i2N ci
> 0 = CELj(C;E).
Therefore, these two linear functions (i.e., Pj(C;E) = cj(E=
P
i2N ci) and CELj(C;E) =
cj cel) take di¤erent values at cj = cel and the same value at cj = ec. In particular,
Pj(C;E) takes a higher value at cj = cel. Therefore, cj Q ec implies
Pj(C;E) = cj
EP
i2N ci
R CELj(C;E).
Hence, ec satises the statement in (ii).
Proof of Lemma 2. Under CEA, there are two cases: (a-1) ch > cl > cea and
(a-2) ch > cea  cl.
(a-1) If ch > cl  cea, then CEA allocates the estate equally. Hence, CEAl(C;E) =
CEAh(C;E) =
E
nh+nl
. Therefore,
Sl(E;C;CEA) = (
E
n
  E
nhch + nlcl
cl),
which satises
Sl(E;C;CEA) =
Enh[ch   cl]
[nh + nl][nhch + nlcl]
> 0. (14)
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Similarly, Sh(E;C;CEA) can be written as
Sh(E;C;CEA) = (
E
n
  E
nhch + nlcl
ch),
which satises
Sh(E;C;CEA) =
Enl[cl   ch]
[nh + nl][nhch + nlcl]
< 0. (15)
(a-2) If ch > cea  cl, then for each agent with claim cl, CEAl(C;E) = cl and for
each agent with claim ch, CEAh(C;E) =
E nlcl
nh
. Therefore,
Sl(E;C;CEA) = cl(1  E
nhch + nlcl
),
which satises
Sl(E;C;CEA) =
cl[nhch + nlcl   E]
nhch + nlcl
> 0. (16)
Similarly, Sh(E;C;CEA) can be written as
Sh(E;C;CEA) = (
E   nlcl
nh
  E
nhch + nlcl
),
which satises
Sh(E;C;CEA) =
nlcl[E   nhch   nlcl]
nh[nhch + nlcl]
< 0. (17)
Under CEL, there are two cases: (b-1) ch > cl > cel and (b-2) ch > cel  cl.
(b-1) If ch > cl > cel, then CEL allocates losses equally. Hence, for each agent
with claim cl, CELl(C;E) = cl   (nhch+nlcl Enh+nl ) and for each agent with claim ch,
CELh(C;E) = ch   (nhch+nlcl Enh+nl ). Therefore,
Sl(E;C;CEL) = [cl   (nhch + nlcl   E
nh + nl
)  E
nhch + nlcl
cl],
which satises
Sl(E;C;CEL) =
nh[cl   ch][nhch + nlcl   E]
[nh + nl][nhch + nlcl]
< 0. (18)
Similarly, Sh(E;C;CEL) can be written as
Sh(E;C;CEL) = [ch   (nhch + nlcl   E
nh + nl
)  E
nhch + nlcl
ch],
which satises
Sh(E;C;CEL) =
nl[ch   cl][nhch + nlcl   E]
[nh + nl][nhch + nlcl]
> 0. (19)
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(b-2) If ch > cel  cl, then for each agent with claim cl, CELl(C;E) = 0 and for
each agent with claim ch, CELh(C;E) = Enh . Therefore,
Sl(E;C;CEL) =   E
nhch + nlcl
cl < 0 (20)
and
Sh(E;C;CEL) =
nl
nh
Ecl
nhch + nlcl
> 0. (21)
Proof of Lemma 3. Below, we plug into Vj;in(P; nh;in; nl;in) = cj;in EP
i2Nl[Nh
ci;in
,
(1 + rf )
P
i2Nl[Nh wi;in for E,
(1 + r)
P
i2Nl[Nh wi;in for
P
i2Nl[Nh ci;in, and
(1 + r)wj for cj .
Hence,
Vj;in(P; nh;in; nl;in) = (1 + r)wj
(1 + rf )
P
i2Nl[Nh wi;in
(1 + r)
P
i2Nl[Nh wi;in
,
= (1 + rf )wj = Pj .
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Pick any nn;in > 0 and nl;in > 0. We know by Corollary
2 that
Sl(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) > 0 and
Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) < 0.
Therefore, by the denition of c (see Lemma 1), cl  c  ch.
(ii) Pick any nn;in > 0 and nl;in > 0. We know by Corollary 2 that
Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) > 0 and
Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) < 0.
Therefore, by the denition of ec (see Lemma 1), cl  ec  ch.
Proof of Lemma 5. (i) There are two possible cases for CEA: (a-1) ch > cl > cea
and (a-2) ch > cea  cl. We know from Corollary 2 (a-1),
Sl(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) =
nh;in
nh;in + nl;in
(1 + rf )(wh   wl).
Thus,
4Sl(CEA;nh;in; nl;in)
4nl;in =  
nh;in
(nh;in + nl;in + 1)(nh;in + nl;in)
(1 + rf )(wh   wl) < 0.
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On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (a-2),
Sl(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = (r   rf )wl.
Thus,
4Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)
4nl;in = 0.
(ii) There are two possible cases for CEA: (a-1) and (a-2). We know from Corollary
2 (a-1),
Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in + nl;in
(1 + rf )(wl   wh).
Thus,
4Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in)
4nl;in =
nh;in(1 + rf )(wl   wh)
(nh;in + nl;in + 1)(nh;in + nl;in)
< 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (a-2),
Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in
(rf   r)wl.
Thus,
4Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in)
4nl;in =
(rf   r)wl
nh;in
< 0.
(iii) There are two possible cases for CEL: (b-1) ch > cl > cel and (b-2) ch > cel 
cl. We know from Corollary 2 (b-1),
Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =
nh;in
nh;in + nl;in
(r   rf )(wl   wh).
Thus,
4Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)
4nh;in =
nl;in
(nh;in + nl;in + 1)(nh;in + nl;in)
(r   rf )(wl   wh) < 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (b-2),
Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =  (1 + rf )wl.
Thus,
4Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)
4nh;in = 0.
(iv) There are two possible cases for CEL: (b-1) and (b-2). We know from Corollary
2 (b-1),
Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in + nl;in
[(r   rf )(wh   wl)].
Thus,
4Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)
4nh;in =  
nl;in
(nh;in + nl;in + 1)(nh;in + nl;in)
(r   rf )(wh   wl) < 0.
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On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (b-2),
Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in
(1 + rf )wl.
Thus,
4Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)
4nh;in =  
nl;in
(nh;in + 1)(nh;in)
(1 + rf )wl < 0.
(v) There are two possible cases for CEA: (a-1) ch > cl > cea and (a-2) ch > cea 
cl. We know from Corollary 2 (a-1),
Sl(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) =
nh;in
nh;in + nl;in
(1 + rf )(wh   wl).
Thus,
4Sl(CEA; nh;in; nl;in)
4nh;in =
nl;in
(nh;in + nl;in + 1)(nh;in + nl;in)
(1 + rf )(wh   wl) > 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (a-2),
Sl(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = (r   rf )wl.
Thus,
4Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)
4nl;in = 0.
(vi) There are two possible cases for CEA: (a-1) and (a-2). We know from Corollary
2 (a-1),
Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in + nl;in
(1 + rf )(wl   wh) < 0.
Thus,
4Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in)
4nh;in =  
nl;in
(nh;in + nl;in + 1)(nh;in + nl;in)
(1 + rf )(wl   wh) > 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (a-2),
Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in
(rf   r)wl < 0.
Thus,
4Sh(CEA; nh;in; nl;in)
4nh;in =  
nl;in
nh;in(nh;in + 1)
(rf   r)wl > 0.
(vii) There are two possible cases for CEL: (b-1) ch > cl > cel and (b-2) ch >
cel  cl. We know from Corollary 2 (b-1),
Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =
nh;in
nh;in + nl;in
(r   rf )(wl   wh) < 0.
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Thus,
4Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)
4nl;in =  
nh;in
(nh;in + nl;in + 1)(nh;in + nl;in)
(r   rf )(wl   wh) > 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (b-2),
Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =  (1 + rf )wl < 0.
Therefore,
4Sl(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)
4nl;in = 0.
(viii) There are two possible cases for CEL: (b-1) and (b-2). We know from Corollary
2 (b-1),
Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in + nl;in
[(r   rf )(wh   wl)] > 0.
Thus,
4Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)
4nl;in =
nh;in
(nh;in + nl;in + 1)(nh;in + nl;in)
[(r   rf )(wh   wl)] > 0.
On the other hand, in Corollary 2 (b-2),
Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) =
nl;in
nh;in
(1 + rf )wl.
Thus,
4Sh(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)
4nl;in =
(nl;in + 1)
nh;in
(1 + rf )wl > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. We know that Pt = (1 + rf )wt and Vt = (1 + r)wt. The
expected payo¤ of a type t agent under P can be written as
P ei = s(1 + r)wt + (1  s)(1 + rf )wt.
Therefore, a type t agent chooses to play in under P if
P ei = s(1 + r)wt + (1  s)(1 + rf )wt  (1 + r)wt = Vi;out.
This condition can be rewritten as
s(1 + r) + (1  s)(1 + rf )  (1 + r).
Since there are no income parameters in this inequality, it implies that for any two
agents of di¤erent types, the condition determining their strategies under P is iden-
tical, i.e.,
P eh  Vh;out , P el  Vl;out. (22)
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Proof of Lemma 7. We analyze P , CEA, and CEL separately since the argu-
mentation for each case will be slightly di¤erent.
(P) Suppose, by a contradiction, that two agents i and j of type t play di¤erent
strategies in equilibrium. By Lemma 3, Pi = (1 + rf )wi in case of bankruptcy. On
the other hand, agent is payo¤ is (1 + r)wi in case of successful completion of the
project and the outside option pays (1 + r)wi. Since for all i; j 2 Nt,
P ei = s[(1 + r)wt] + (1  s)[(1 + rf )wt] and
P ej = s[(1 + r)wt] + (1  s)[(1 + rf )wt],
we have
s[(1 + r)wt] + (1  s)[(1 + rf )wt]  (1 + r)wt ,
s[(1 + r)wt] + (1  s)[(1 + rf )wt]  (1 + r)wt.
However, this logical statement implies that agents i and j cannot have di¤erent
strategies in equilibrium; a contradiction. Hence the result follows.
The proofs for CEA and CEL require a separate analysis for l type agents and
h type agents, since these agents are treated di¤erently by CEA and CEL.
(CEA) Suppose, by contradiction, that in equilibrium there exists an agent i 2 Nh
who plays in whereas another agent j 2 Nh plays out under CEA. We denote the
number of type h agents playing in as nh;in and the number of type l agents playing
in as nl;in. We consider two cases: (CEA - i) there is at least one agent k 2 Nl who
plays in and (CEA - ii) there is no agent k 2 Nl who plays in.
(CEA - i) If there is at least one agent k 2 Nl who plays in, i.e., nl;in  1, by
Corollary 2,
if ch > cl > cea, then Sh(CEA; in) =
nl
nh + nl
[(1 + rf )(wl   wh)] < 0 and
if ch > cea  cl, then Sh(CEA; in) = nl(rf   r)wl
nh
< 0.
Hence, we know that Si(CEA;nh;in; nl;in) < 0. Also, the equilibrium property and
our tie-breaking assumption imply that
V ei;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = P
e
i + (1  s)Si(CEA; nh;in; nl;in)  Vi;out
and
V ej;in(CEA; nh;in + 1; nl;in) = P
e
j + (1  s)Sj(CEA; nh;in + 1; nl;in) < Vj;out.
Now, assume that player j switches to in. Then, number of type h agents playing in
is nh;in + 1. The denition of CEA, the equilibrium property, and our tie-breaking
assumption imply that
V ei;in(CEA; nh;in + 1; nl;in) = V
e
j;in(CEA; nh;in + 1; nl;in) < Vj;out  Vi;out.
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On the other hand, by Corollary 2 and Lemma 5,
Si(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) < Si(CEA; nh;in + 1; nl;in) < 0.
Hence,
V ei;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) < V
e
i;in(CEA; nh;in + 1; nl;in).
Therefore,
V ei;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) < V
e
i;in(CEA; nh;in + 1; nl;in)  Vi;out
) V ei;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) < Vi;out.
However, if the above inequality is satised, agent i playing in at the beginning
cannot be an optimal action for him; a contradiction. Hence the result follows.
(CEA - ii) If there is no agent k 2 Nl who plays in under CEA in equilibrium, i.e.,
nl;in = 0, this implies
Si(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = 0 and
V ei;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = P
e
i .
However, this implies that P ei  Vi;out. Hence, from (P) the result follows.
Now, suppose that in equilibrium there exists an agent i 2 Nl who plays in
whereas another agent j 2 Nl plays out under CEA. We consider two cases: (CEA -
iii) there is at least one agent k 2 Nh who plays in and (CEA - iv) there is no agent
k 2 Nh who plays in.
(CEA - iii) If there is at least one agent k 2 Nh who plays in, i.e., nh;in  1, by
Corollary 2,
if ch > cl > cea, then Sh(CEA; in) =
nl
nh + nl
[(1 + rf )(wl   wh)] < 0 and
if ch > cea  cl, then Sh(CEA; in) = nl(rf   r)wl
nh
< 0.
Hence, we know that
Sk(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) < 0 and
V ek;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = P
e
k + (1  s)Sk(CEA; nh;in; nl;in)  Vk;out.
Now, assume that agent j switches to playing in. The denition of CEA, the equi-
librium property, and our tie-breaking assumption imply that
V ei;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in + 1) = V
e
j;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in + 1) < Vj;out  Vi;out
where,
V ej;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in + 1) = P
e
j + (1  s)Sj(CEA; nh;in; nl;in + 1) and
Sj(CEA; nh;in; nl;in + 1) > 0.
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However, if
V ek;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = P
e
k + (1  s)Sk(CEA; nh;in; nl;in)  Vk;out,
then by proportionality,
P ek  Vk;out , P ej  Vj;out
and by Corollary 2 and Lemma 5
Sk(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) < 0 and Sj(CEA; nh;in; nl;in + 1) > 0
leads to
V ej;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in + 1) = V
e
i;in(CEA;nh;in; nl;in + 1)  Vj;out,
which is a contradiction. Thus, in equilibrium if it is an optimal action for a type h
agent to play in under CEA, it cannot be an optimal action for any type l agent to
play out, since any type l agent will have non-negative transfers. Hence, the result
follows.
(CEA - iv) If there is no agent k 2 Nh who plays in under CEA in equilibrium,
i.e., nh;in = 0, this implies
Si(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = 0 and
V ei;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = P
e
i .
Then, if agent j switches to playing in, by Corollary 2 and Lemma 5,
Sk(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) > Sk(CEA; nh;in; nl;in + 1).
Then, there will still be no agent k 2 Nh who plays in. Hence, expected payo¤s of
type l agents will not be a¤ected by the existence of other type l agents playing in,
which implies
V ei;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in) = V
e
i;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in + 1)
= V ej;in(CEA; nh;in; nl;in + 1) < Vj;out  Vi;out
) V ei;in(CEA;nh;in; nl;in) < Vi;out.
If the above inequality is satised, playing in at the beginning cannot be an optimal
action for agent i; a contradiction. Hence the result follows.
(CEL) The proof is similar to the proof for CEA. Suppose, by contradiction, that in
equilibrium there exists an agent i 2 Nl who plays in whereas another agent j 2 Nl
plays out under CEL. We denote the number of type h agents playing in as nh;in
and the number of type l agents playing in as nl;in. We consider two cases: (CEL -
i) there is at least one agent k 2 Nh who plays in (CEL - ii) there is no agent k 2 Nh
who plays in.
(CEL - i) If there is at least one agent k 2 Nh who plays in, Corollary 2, the
equilibrium property and our tie-breaking assumption imply that
Vi;out  V ei;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) and
49
V ej;in(CEL; nh;in + 1; nl;in) < Vj;out.
Now assume that player j switches to in. The number of type l agents playing in is
nl + 1 now. The denition of CEL, the equilibrium property, and our tie-breaking
assumption imply that
V ei;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in + 1) = V
e
j;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in + 1) < Vj;out  Vi;out.
On the other hand, by Lemma 5,
Si(CEL; nh;in; nl;in + 1) > Si(CEL; nh;in; nl;in).
Hence,
V ei;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in + 1) > V
e
i;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in).
Therefore,
V ei;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) < V
e
i;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in + 1)  Vi;out
) V ei;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) < Vi;out.
However, if the above inequality is satised playing in at the beginning cannot be an
optimal action for agent i; a contradiction. Hence the result follows.
(CEL - ii) If there is no agent k 2 Nl who plays in under CEL in equilibrium (i.e.,
nl;in = 0), this implies
Si(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) = 0 and
V ei;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) = P
e
i .
However, this implies that P ei  Vi;out. Hence, from (P) the result follows.
Now, suppose, by contradiction, that in equilibrium there exists an agent i 2 Nh
who plays in, whereas another agent j 2 Nh plays out. We consider two cases: (CEL
- iii) there is at least one agent k 2 Nl who plays in (CEL - iv) there is no agent
k 2 Nl who plays in.
(CEL - iii) If there is at least one agent k 2 Nl who plays in, by Corollary 2,
if ch > cl > cel, Sl(CEL; in) =
nh
nh + nl
(r   rf )(wl   wh) and
if ch > cel  cl, Sl(CEL; in) =  (1 + rf )wl.
Hence, we know that
Sk(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) < 0 and
V ek;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) = P
e
k + Sk(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)  Vk;out.
Now, assume that agent j switches to playing in. The denition of CEL, the equi-
librium property and our tie-breaking assumption imply that
V ej;in(CEL; nh;in + 1; nl;in) = V
e
i;in(CEL; nh;in + 1; nl;in)  Vi;out  Vj;out
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where,
V ej;in(CEL; nh;in + 1; nl;in) = P
e
j + (1  s)Sj(CEL; nh;in + 1; nl;in) and
Sj(CEL; nh;in + 1; nl;in) > 0.
However, if
V ek;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) = P
e
k + (1  s)Sk(CEL; nh;in; nl;in)  Vk;out
then by proportionality,
P ek  Vk;out , P ej  Vj;out
and by Corollary 2 and Lemma 5
Sk(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) < 0 and Sj(CEL; nh;in; nl;in + 1) > 0
leads to
V ej;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in + 1) = V
e
i;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in + 1)  Vj;out,
which is a contradiction. Thus, if it is optimal for a type l agent to play in under CEL
in equilibrium, it cannot be optimal for any type h agent to play out in equilibrium,
since any type h agent will have non-negative transfers. Hence, the result follows.
(CEL - iv) If there is no agent k 2 Nl who plays in under CEL in equilibrium (i.e.,
nl;in = 0), this implies
Si(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) = 0 and
V ei;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) = P
e
i;in.
Then if agent j switches to playing in, by Lemma 5,
Sk(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) > Sk(CEL; nh;in + 1; nl;in).
Then, there will still be no agent k 2 Nl who plays in:Hence, the expected payo¤s of
type h agents will not be a¤ected by the existence of other type h agents playing in,
which implies
V ei;in(CEL; nh;in; nl;in) = V
e
j;in(CEL; nh;in + 1; nl;in)
= V ei;in(CEL; nh;in + 1; nl;in)
 Vj;out  Vi;out.
If the inequality above is satised strictly, then playing in at the beginning cannot
be an optimal action for agent i; a contradiction. If it is satised, on the other hand,
with equality, then it is not optimal for agent j to play out at the beginning (due to
the tie-breaking rule) which is again a contradiction. Hence the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 8. (i) By Corollary 2, Sl(CEA; in) > 0 and Sh(CEA; in) < 0.
Therefore, if type l agents (who are favored by CEA) play out, this implies that
V el (CEA; in) = P
e
l + (1  s)Sl(CEA; in) < Vl;out.
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Since Sl(CEA; in) > 0, this implies that P el < Vl;out. Using proportionality, P
e
l <
Vl;out if and only if P eh < Vh;out. However, we know that Sh(CEA; in) < 0. Therefore,
V eh (CEA; in) = P
e
h + (1  s)Sh(CEA; in) > Vh;out
cannot hold. Hence, this implies that playing in cannot be optimal for type h agents
(who are disfavored by CEA), if it is not optimal for type l agents.
(ii) By Corollary 2, Sh(CEL; in) > 0 and Sl(CEL; in) < 0. Therefore, if type h
agents (who are favored by CEL) play out, this implies that
V eh (CEL; in) = P
e
h + (1  s)Sh(CEL; in) < Vh;out.
Since Sh(CEL; in) > 0, this implies that P eh < Vh;out. Using proportionality, P
e
h <
Vh;out if and only if P el < Vl;out. However, we know that Sl(CEL; in) < 0. Therefore,
V el (CEL; in) = P
e
l + (1  s)Sl(CEL; in) > Vl;out
cannot hold. Hence, this implies that playing in cannot be optimal for type l agents
(who are disfavored by CEL), if it is not optimal for type h agents.
The comparative statics in the following appendix sections are used in obtaining
the results in Section 5.
C - Comparative static analyses on nl; wl; nh and wh
Sceah S
cea
l
ch > cea  cl ch > cl  cea ch > cea  cl ch > cl  cea
nl     0  
nh + + 0 +
wl   + +  
wh 0   0 +
Table C1: The E¤ect of Changes in nl; nh; wl and wh on Sceat
Scelh S
cel
l
ch > cl > cel ch > cel  cl ch > cl > cel ch > cel  cl
nl + + + 0
nh       0
wl   + +  
wh + 0   0
Table C2: The E¤ect of Changes in nl; nh; wl and wh on Scelt
D - Comparative static analyses on r and rf
Sceah S
cea
l
ch > cea  cl ch > cl  cea ch > cea  cl ch > cl  cea
r   0 + 0
rf +     +
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Table D1: The E¤ect of Changes in r and rf on Sceat
Scelh S
cel
l
ch > cl > cel ch > cel  cl ch > cl > cel ch > cel  cl
r + 0   0
rf   + +  
Table D2: The E¤ect of Changes in r and rf on Scelt
53
